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ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation:

A comparative study of implementation of existing
measures for oil spill response in Northern Indian
Ocean and investigate improvement mechanisms.

Degree:

Master of Science

Oil is a major source of energy in the world. The geographical distribution of oil rich
regions away from the major consumers has led to transportation of large quantities of
oil across the ocean. The contribution of maritime transport in the total quantity
estimated to be entering into the sea annually is much lower than the land based
sources. However, the risk of a large quantity of oil being released in a small area in
case of a marine casualty leading to disastrous consequences, has forced the attention
of public and the environmental regulators towards shipping.
The dissertation briefly discusses the harmful effects of oil in the marine environment
and combat techniques for contextual support to the topic. A short look is taken at the
history of oil spill response to understand the development of existing mechanism.
The mechanism for responding to oil spills is a combination of well developed
response organisation structure, a comprehensive contingency planning, adequate
equipment & manpower and the supporting legislative framework. The existing
regulatory mechanism addressing these aspects is summarised to compare them
against actual implementation by the countries in the region.
A comprehensive examination of the factors affecting the risk profile of Northern
Indian Ocean towards an oil spill incident is undertaken. Some of the unique factors
affecting this risk include the concentration of major oil producing nations leading to
two thirds of the global seaborne oil trade passing across the area on two highly
congested tanker routes, geopolitical factors which caused the largest oil spill ever in
the world history during first gulf war and developmental needs taking priority over
environmental concerns.
The capabilities of the region in oil spill response is examined by dividing the
countries into three subgroup- South Asia, Middle East and North-eastern Africa and
investigating the set up provisioned by the government, The role of private
organisations and the regional cooperative arrangements is also explored. The
information is collated and evaluated to determine the strengths and weaknesses of the
current system in the three subgroups. The existing mechanisms for oil spill response
in two other sea areas – North Sea and Baltic Sea, have also been summarised to
compare and contrast the capabilities with the three groups.
The dissertation thus critically analyses the existing capabilities in the Northern
Indian Ocean and presents a number of recommendations for improvements.
KEYWORDS:
Oil Pollution, Contingency Planning, OPRC, Indian Ocean, Oil
Spill Response, Tiered Response,
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1

Background

The discovery of oil 1 in the 20th century as an efficient and convenient source of
energy revolutionised the concept of quality fuels for industrialised countries as it
suited the rapid technological advances especially in internal combustion engines. In
later years, it became a frontline energy source overtaking coal. However, the
imbalances in the production and consumption patterns resulted in the requirement for
movement of large quantities of oil through various regions. The shipping provided
the most efficient and economical means of transport for this oil and in 2007, the
global seaborne oil trade was approximately 43 million barrels per day or about half
of the world oil production (Energy Information Administration, 2009).
Though the initial efforts of exploiting oil did result in oil pollution experienced in
ports and coastal waters, these were considered as minor risks causing fire hazards
and damage in ports and insignificant health menace. However, the issue
progressively gained significance through the early 20th century and efforts were
initiated to control the oily discharges from the ships and prevent leakages of oil when
loading, unloading or refuelling at ports (Pritchard, 1987).
The drastic impact of oil pollution on the marine environment and the economic
dependence of coastal communities on marine industries such as fishing, tourism etc.
became an increasing problem as greater knowledge about the harmful effects of oil
was gained. It was also discovered that the recovery and combating mechanisms
1

The term ‘Oil’ is used generically for crude oil and its derived products.

1

towards such pollution were extremely difficult posing technical as well as practical
difficulties. The effects of the pollution were, in fact, far-reaching and transgressed
the conventional boundaries defining losses. The issue has been aptly summarised by
Ornitz & Champ (2002) quoting ITOPF and USCG as follows:
Oil spills result in tangible, direct losses of life, injuries, damage to
environment, cargo and vessel, loss of time, loss of consumer base and many
indirect costs. Oil spills are no longer considered an avoidable accident of
environmental condition or a function of catastrophic events.
The pollution by oil in the marine environment can be caused by many
sources .Though the relative contribution of each of the recognised sources may differ
in distinct marine areas, it is well established that the land based sources2 are likely to
be the most significant even in marine areas with heavy tanker traffic (GESAMP,
2001). However, their entry into the sea is much less conspicuous, being released
continuously in moderate dissolved concentrations and therefore detectable by
chemical analysis only. In contrast, the impact of a ship / tanker accident releasing a
sudden large quantity of oil results in catastrophic effects exemplified by sympathetic
images of oily sea birds on polluted beaches. It creates much larger negative publicity
despite such sea based activities in general and accidental ship discharges in particular
making a minor source of oil pollution in marine environment (GESAMP, 2007 &
GESAMP, 1993).Thus, the media frenzy in highlighting such an incident increases
the perception of the risk associated with shipping as a major pollutant of the oceans
by the society.
However, the impact of shipping may also involve many other facets and the issue
furthermore needs to be considered in the light of steady growth, over the years, in
both the size and number of vessels particularly the tankers which carry extremely
large quantities of oil or oil products. A single VLCC is capable of carrying more than
200,000 to 300,000 tons of oil at one time. Thus, any single spill caused by such a
ship due to marine accidents, collisions, groundings etc. may be disastrous. Even if
the risk associated with the occurrence of such an accident is significantly lower, it
2

Land based sources account more than 50 % share of input of oil into the sea globally, GESAMP,
1993

2

evokes much greater concern due to inconceivable consequences to marine
environment in the affected area.
Therefore, this dissertation will focus on the oil pollution threats in the marine
environment through sea based activities only. These will include maritime
transportation in general and tankers in particular. The operational and accidental
discharges from the ships (both tankers and non-tankers), offshore exploration and
production facilities and other miscellaneous sea based activities handling oil e.g.
coastal refineries, oil storage facilities and marine oil terminals etc. constitute the
major categories of pollution originated from sea based activities. Though, each of
them require a different strategy for addressing the issue of prevention and response /
control measures, the broad parameters for the overall oil spill response mechanism
may be deemed to be same in all the cases.
As Ornitz & Champ (2002) have rightly postulated regarding this issue:
The oil spill response is an extremely complex and challenging cross
disciplinary experience. In the operational decision making process, it
combines a wide range of issues and activities under emergency response
conditions that include – the nature of the material spilled, which undergoes
changes in physical and chemical properties and biodegradation over time,
local environmental conditions , sensitivity of impacted natural resources and
selection and effectiveness of response/clean up technologies.
Thus, capability of prevention and response to oil pollution at sea depended upon the
technical expertise available and the constraints of financial resources. Further, the
Torrey Canyon incident in 1967 also indirectly fuelled further disparity in these
methods between the developed and the developing countries.

The focus of

international community which was earlier more or less on operational discharges of
oil from ships understandably shifted to the massive levels of oil pollution resulting
from a shipping casualty (Cormack, 1999). It led to the strengthening of legal
framework, revamping of compensation regime and capacity building by major
industrialised nations for prevention and response measures. This also included
greater research to improve the technologies for more efficient combating methods.
3

However, the developing countries lagged behind in such efforts due to constraints of
resources and technical expertise.
The experience gained during the years has justified a cooperative approach by all
parties involved to ensure effective response. These include IMO, national
governments, industry organisations and expert / research organisations. The OPRC
Convention, 19903 also promotes the spirit of bilateral cooperation between countries
and between governments and industry (IPIECA, 2005).
1.2

Objectives of Study

The study aims to achieve the following:
(a)

Describe the harmful effects of an oil spill on marine environment &
coastal economy and discuss existing oil spill response techniques.

(b)

Describe the historical development of oil spill response mechanism
and discuss existing arrangements.

(c)

Examine various threats for an oil pollution incident in Northern Indian
Ocean and develop the risk profile.

(d)

Identify the criteria for evaluating effectiveness of an oil spill response
mechanism.

(e)

Discuss the capabilities of individual countries in the Northern Indian
Ocean in responding to an oil spill incident and role of regional
cooperative arrangements.

(f)

Identify strengths and weaknesses of the existing arrangements in the
region.

(g)

Make recommendations for improvement in the existing arrangement
for oil spill response in Northern Indian Ocean.

1.3

Research Methodology

The study primarily intends to utilize the qualitative approach by initially proceeding
to collate the available information about the existing arrangements for oil spill
3

International convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation came into force
on 13 May 1995.
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response in the countries surrounding the region. The information anticipated
included the details regarding the regulatory framework, international conventions,
national provisions and operational structure, regional agreements, and industry
initiatives. A literature search is also undertaken to provide an analytical support and
critical review on the subject.
However, the author was surprised that the area of the Northern Indian Ocean has not
been provided sufficient attention by scholars and researchers. The literature,
information and other data about the marine oil pollution issues was also extremely
limited. The few sources available generally described the technical aspects of oil
pollution instead of focusing on the administrative or operational set up for
coordinating response. This posed a difficulty as very few details about many
countries were available. The author took up the challenge on the advice of the
professors and the supervisor and decided to generate the information needed for the
study by directly approaching the concerned organisations. These included maritime
administrations, oil spill response agencies, national environmental agencies, regional
organisations working in the field of oil pollution, academic institutions and ocean
research institutes. The process was quite cumbersome and exhausting which
involved large correspondences, delicate negotiations, patience and finally convincing
them to share the information. Thus, the author was moderately successful. However,
there are still certain areas where insufficient data is available. Further, some of the
data was shared in private capacity or through informal or unofficial sources, thus it is
utilised without a reference or citation for ethical reasons.
Finally, the available information is evaluated in respect of the identified criteria to
formulate arguments towards critical analysis and concluding proposition.
The research work of the dissertation has been divided into five chapters. The topic is
introduced in the first chapter with preliminary explanatory background. Chapter two
will present the need for action towards marine oil spills and discuss the international
legislations and technical details about the fate of marine oil and its harmful effects to
environment and coastal economy. Chapter three will critically analyse and evaluate
the risk of oil spills in the Northern Indian Ocean and discuss various factors that
impinge on the risk matrix. Chapter four examines the capabilities for oil spill
5

response of various countries in the area. The detailed analysis will be undertaken by
dividing them in three groupings- South Asia, Middle East and East Africa. The
efficacy of regional initiatives and capability set up by the private entities in this area
will also be investigated. The arrangements existing for response in two other ocean
areas are also summarised to compare and contrast the capabilities available in the
three subgroups to other regions of the world. The concluding Chapter five provides
recommendations as perceived by the author based on the analysis to help facilitate
the implementation strategies addressing the deficiencies and weaknesses in the
system.

6

CHAPTER 2
MARINE OIL SPILL- IMPACT AND RESPONSE

2.1

Oil – Our Premier Energy Source

Crude oil and other products derived from it have become a major source of energy in
all the regions of the world which accounted for about 35 percent of the world’s
primary energy demand in 2005 (IEA, 2007). Although its overall share is likely to
decrease over the years, it is still expected to account for 32 percent of the world’s
energy demand by 2030 (SeeTable.1) due to the economic resurgence of China, India
and other developing economies.
Table 1: World primary energy demand in the reference scenario4.
Source

1980

2000

2005

2015

2030

Coal

1786

2292

2892

3988

4994

Oil

3106

3647

4000

4720

5585

Gas

1237

2089

2354

3044

3948

Nuclear

186

675

721

804

854

Hydro

147

226

251

327

416

Biomass & Waste

753

1041

1149

1334

1615

Other Renewable

12

53

61

145

308

7228

10023

11429

14361

17721

Total

Source: World Energy Outlook 2007, International Energy Agency.

4

Tonne of oil equivalent (toe) is a unit of energy equal to the amount of energy released by burning
one tonne of crude oil.
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The important point to note here is that almost all the increase in the oil production
will occur in the traditional oil rich countries and thus the reliance on imported oil by
the main consuming regions including the OECD and Asian economies will increase
substantially (IEA, 2008).The world oil tanker fleet at the beginning of 2009
comprised of 9159 tankers with 418 million DWT and the tanker order book in
relation to the current supply, reflecting high demand for oil transportation, stood at
41 percent (ISL,2009a).
There is a high degree of uncertainty regarding the data concerning inputs of
quantities of oil into the sea from different sources. The US National Academy of
Sciences estimated it to be 1.3 million tonnes per year with 30 percent attributed to
marine transportation including operational discharges from ships (National Research
Council, 2003). However, the contribution was estimated to be 36 percent out of the
1.2 million tonnes by GESAMP (2007).More focussed data concerning the causes of
oil spills resulting from shipping activities is provided by ITOPF 5(2009a) in Figure. 1.

Figure 1:Cause of large spills (> 700 tonnes),1974-2008.
Source: ITOPF Handbook 2009

5

The International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF) is a not-for-profit organisation,
involved in all aspects of preparing for and responding to ship-source spills of oil, chemicals and other
substances in the marine environment.

8

The spills from the shipping accidents, mainly those caused by the tankers, release a
large quantity of oil and thus pose a much higher threat to the marine environment
than other sources of pollution. As can be seen from Figure 1, accidents were the
main cause of the large oil spills with groundings and collisions accounting for 63
percent of the total incidents.

2.2

Marine Pollution by Oil

UNCLOS Article 1(1) (4) defines pollution of the marine environment as
the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the
marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result in
such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to
human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other
legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and
reduction of amenities.
Thus, it also incorporates the contamination of the seas by oil spilled during maritime
transportation and other sea based activities. The important aspects of this definition
are that it is both action oriented as well as effect oriented and provides a broad
parameter in that the pollution not only exists when the effects really occur, but also,
when they are likely to happen (Molenaar,1998). The last part of the explanation has
contributed to the existing mechanisms of the oil spill prevention and response regime
including the right of intervention by the coastal state (Kennish, 1997).

2.3

Oil- Properties and its Fate in the Marine Environment

Although any type of marine pollution involves definite measures towards prevention
and combating mechanisms, oil, due to its typical constitution and behaviour, presents
an enormous challenge. The specific behaviour processes that occur after an oil spill
determine how the oil should be cleaned up and its effect on the environment (Fingas
& Charles, 2001).The various types of petroleum oils range from light volatile

9

fractions to heavy tar-like residues and have unique characteristics. These
characteristics influence their fate or behaviour and the harm or damage caused to the
marine environment (National Research Council, US, Ocean Affairs Board, 1975).
The main physical properties which affect the behaviour and persistence of oil spilled
at sea are specific gravity, distillation characteristics, viscosity and pour point, all of
which depend upon its chemical composition (ITOPF, 2009). The details about these
properties are placed at Appendix ‘A’. When oil is spilled at sea, it spreads and moves
on the surface of water while undergoing a number of chemical and physical changes,
collectively termed as weathering (ITOPF Handbook, 2009 & Fingas& Charles,
2001).Figure 2 represents these different processes.

Figure 2 : Weathering process.
Source: ITOPF Handbook 2009
One more important aspect to remember is that the potential human and
environmental effects of oil spilled depend on not only the quantity and type of oil
spilled, but also the location and different ecological and oceanographic conditions.
Thus, a lot of models have been developed to estimate ambient hydrocarbon
concentrations translating into the overall effects expected ( National research Council,
2003).However, the predictive models can provide a reasonable assessment of the
track, location, shape and weathering of oil spill if more detailed data, especially for
the topography and unique shoreline interaction etc. for any given geographical area
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is available, which is generally accurate only if it is obtained in real time
( GESAMP,1993).

2.4

Effects of Oil Spills

Oil spills can seriously affect the marine life of the affected area with an inevitable
loss of marine resources and negatively influence the economy of the coastal
community. The effects can be divided into two main categories:

2.4.1

Effect of Oil on Marine Ecosystems

The impact of oil on a marine ecosystem is not uniform and varies according
to the general location or living area of the species- near or at the surface of
the sea and at the seabed. Though ITOPF (2009) does not agree conclusively
about any long term harmful effects of oil on marine ecosystems, a lot of
research in this field suggests a different picture. The principal species known
to be affected are mentioned below (Boesch & Herchner, 1974):
(a)

Birds and Mammals The most recognisable visual image

attributable to oil pollution by a layman is that of an oily bird dying on
an oiled beach. There are a large number of birds reported to be killed
after heavy oil spills due to fouling of their feathers and ingestion of oil.
The biological systems including their breeding are also found to be
severely hampered even in the surviving birds and mammals.
(b)

Fish and Fisheries Resources

The fish

are severely

affected due to the damage caused by the oil to the eggs and larvae
apart from the killing of fish trapped in oil. The tainting of commercial
fish, oysters and mussels has also been experienced.
(c)

Plankton

Toxic and sub lethal effects on the plankton

have been reported to be caused by oil.
(d)

Wetlands

The salt marshes and mangroves swamps suffer

a long-term impact thereby adversely affecting the associated marine
habitat supporting numerous species.
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(e)

Special Environments

Special environments like Polar

Regions, coral reefs and estuaries may experience much higher
degradation compared to normal shoreline.

2.4.2

Effects of Oil on a Coastal Economy

The effects on economy may be short term or long term and may include the
following:
(a)

Contamination of coastal amenities e.g. recreational activities,

leading to serious effects on tourism and related industries.
(b)

Fisheries and mariculture in the area is affected by damage to

equipments, contamination of area and clean up operations.
(c)

Coastal industries using sea water intake e. g. Power plants,

desalination plants etc. may also be seriously affected.

2.5

History of Oil Spill Response

The issue of oil pollution from ships came into prominence initially during and
immediately after the First World War due to highly flammable gasoline discharges
causing damage and fire to ports. The first efforts towards dealing with these incidents
were quite basic with regulations by various countries to prohibit the oily discharges
from ships within a designated zone, 3-mile of territorial waters in Britain in 1918 and
25-mile zone in the United States as per local regulations in 1921 (Pritchard, 1987).
The efforts of the British government with the participation of ship-owners, oil
companies and harbour officials resulted in the introduction of Oil in Navigable
Waters Act,1922 which was the first attempt of legislating the issue concerning oil
pollution both in the national and international realms. Further, the cooperation
between Britain and the United States led to an international conference to address the
issue in Washington in 1926. Although the conference failed to adopt any convention,
it laid the ground for the voluntary adoption of a 50-mile prohibition zone by British
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ship-owners, which was later followed by other European countries as well as the
United States 6(Pamborides, 1999).
Similar efforts on oil pollution control at international level were attempted in the
League of Nations in 1935 which, however, also failed but brought forward many
new concepts including that of penalties sufficient to act as deterrents against acts of
pollution, provisions of reception facilities by port and some arrangements for
treatment of oily wastes onboard ships (Mitchell, 1994).
An international agreement on oil pollution finally fructified in the form of the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954
popularly known as OILPOL7.It was later amended in 1962 and 1969 to cope with the
technical difficulties to ensure compliance of limits of permitted quantities of oil in
oily discharges from ships, strengthen the enforcement provisions and the reporting
requirements (Khee & Tan, 2006).
The Torrey Canyon 8 disaster in 1967 brought into focus the need to address the
accidental discharges from the ships in addition to the operational discharges which
were the main areas of concern prior to this incident (Sands, 2003). Further, the
pollution affecting Britain from foreign tanker spilling oil outside the territorial seas
of Britain also posed problems of jurisdiction for initiating preventive actions by the
coastal state. This laid the foundation for not only the Intervention Convention,1969 ,
to be adopted providing the right of intervention to a coastal state in such a case, but
also for many other important aspects to be addressed in respect of liability and
compensation for pollution damage by ships, prevention of accidental pollution
through reinforcing design & construction standards, operational procedures and
training of seafarers ( Franckx, & Basedow & Magnus, 2007).The significant
consequence was , however, the development of the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973(MARPOL). Although the convention faced
difficulty in getting support for ratification, it took another series of tanker accidents

6

100 mile zone was promulgated in United States.
Adopted on 12 May 1954, the convention was initiated by British Government in the absence of IMO.
8
TORREY CANYON ran aground off England coast on 18 March 1967 in which entire cargo of
approximately 119,000 tonnes of crude oil was lost
7
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including that of Argo Merchant9 in 1976 to prepare ground for a protocol for the
convention to be developed and adopted in 1978 and for these to come together and
enter into force (Ehlers & Lagoni, 2006).
2.6

Regulations Governing Oil Pollution

Although the initial efforts for regulating oil pollution at sea were largely driven by
the national interests of a few major maritime states, IMO became the forum for
implementation of the international conventions comprehensively addressing almost
every aspect of the issue. The important instruments impacting the oil spill control
regime are mentioned below:

2.6.1

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from

Ships, 1973 as amended by protocol of 1978( MARPOL 73/78) This is the
most important of the IMO conventions on marine pollution and aims to
achieve

complete elimination of intentional pollution of the marine

environment by oil and other harmful substances and the minimisation of
accidental discharges of such substances. It incorporates measures about the
design standards, operational procedures, surveys, inspections and emergency
planning and preparedness by ships and other stakeholders to prevent oil
pollution from ships.

2.6.2

International Convention for The Safety of Life at Sea, 1974

(SOLAS)

This is primarily considered to be maritime safety convention

but also indirectly impinges upon prevention of oil pollution and safety of
environment. The design and construction standards for ships cater to tankers
as well as non tankers and ensure the minimum risk of pollution due to
accident or during normal operations. The significant part that can be
considered as directly affecting oil pollution is chapter IX, the ISM Code,
which specifically incorporates environment protection in the safety
management system of ships as well as shipping companies and encourages
active involvement in pollution prevention from ships.

9

ARGO MERCHANT ran aground on Nantucket Shoals, off Massachusetts, USA, on 15 December
1976, and spilled her entire cargo (28,000 tonnes) of fuel oil.
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2.6.3

International Convention On Oil Preparedness Response And

Cooperation, 1990

This was the landmark convention as it provided a

framework for extensive measures towards not only prevention of oil pollution,
but also, building up response capabilities and mechanisms to combat an oil
spill. In addition to reinforcing certain existing provisions in MARPOL and
SOLAS, it provided for the states to establish a national system for prompt
response to oil pollution incidents which should include a contingency plan,
provision of minimum required oil spill combating equipment, regular
exercises and training of personnel. It also stressed the importance of
cooperation among the states at bilateral, regional and global level and also
among the states and the oil industry, port authorities and other stakeholders.
The importance of technical cooperation and mutual assistance agreements
and research and development was also emphasised. Thus, it is a premier
convention for developing a global oil pollution response regime.

2.6.4

International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution

Damage (1992 CLC) and the 1971 International Convention on the
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil
Pollution Damage (1971 Fund Convention) as amended in 1992 and
Supplementary 2003.

These two conventions provide a compensation

regime for oil pollution damage including clean up costs and are funded by the
tanker owners and the oil receiving companies respectively.

2.6.5

International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High

Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, 1969 The convention empowers
the coastal state to
take such measures on the high seas as may be necessary to prevent,
mitigate or eliminate grave and imminent danger to their coastline or
related interests from pollution or threat of pollution of the sea by oil,
following upon a maritime casualty or acts related to such a casualty,
which may reasonably be expected to result in major harmful
consequences.
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Thus, it created a mechanism where the interests of the coastal state are also
given priority due to the threat of pollution though balanced by a need for
consultations by the coastal state with all appropriate stakeholders.

2.6.6

International Convention on Salvage, 1989

This

convention

promoted the salvors to undertake an operation with fewer chances of success
but likely to result in substantially reducing or preventing damage to the
marine environment. It provided a suitable compensation to the salvor in such
scenario if he has failed to earn a reward in a conventional way.
According to GESAMP (1993), the problem of marine oil pollution is addressed by
the current legislative regime in the following ways:

2.7

-

Reducing accidents.

-

Reducing the consequences of accidents.

-

Combating major oil pollution incidents.

-

Preventing operational pollution.

-

Protecting special geographical area.

-

Providing compensation.

-

Helping implementation.

Stakeholders in Oil Pollution Response

It is paramount that various stakeholders contributing towards a successful and
efficient regime for preparedness and response to an oil spill undertake their
responsibilities seriously and sincerely. The responsibilities of a few of the major
stakeholders are discussed in the following paragraphs:

2.7.1

States/Governments The role of governments needs to be considered

in three different categories:
-

Flag State

This has a primary role in ensuring safe

maritime oil transportation and is responsible for establishing and
maintaining measures for effective application and enforcement of the

16

relevant international conventions to achieve maritime safety and
environment protection (Ornitz & Champ, 2002).
-

Port State

This has been considered as providing the last of

the safety nets protecting human life and the environment from
accidents and oil spills in the form of port state control. Thus, it also
has to contribute towards weeding out substandard shipping (IPIECA,
2005).
-

Coastal State The importance of the coastal state needs to be

understood with reference to the development of national policies for
shipping in general and oil pollution in particular , with regard to a
long environmentally fragile coastline, proximity to major oil
transportation routes and absence of ports regularly used by ships
(Molenaar,1998).Despite obvious pressures and constraints against
instituting such measures ,it has to be proactive in its duty to protect
and preserve the environment as mandated by UNCLOS.

2.7.2

Ship-Owners and Operators

Operational

safety

is

the

responsibility of the ship-owners and operators and thus they have to ensure
strict compliance with all of the measures concerning maritime safety and
environment protection including design, construction, maintenance, manning,
operation, and safety management of the ships (Viega,2003).

2.7.3

Cargo Owners and Charterers

Although they do not have a

direct role in this context, they certainly have an interest in making sure that
the cargo reaches its final destination safely by ensuring that the ship is
operated properly. Consequently, they have to ensure a balance between
quality, price and risk while selecting a ship thereby discouraging operation of
substandard ships (Khee & Tan, 2006).

2.7.4

Protection & Indemnity (P&I) Clubs and Insurance Industry They

have an inherent interest in reducing marine casualties and more importantly,
any major oil pollution which is likely to result in huge compensation costs.
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Thus, they are expected to promote good shipping practices including
compliance of safety management system (Khee & Tan, 2006).

2.7.5

It has generally been observed that a

Classification Societies

majority of flag states have delegated many functions regarding survey and
certification to the classification societies. Thus, in addition to their traditional
role of classification of the ships, they have a responsibility to ensure the
promotion of safety culture through stringent observance of the rules &
standards concerning design, construction and operation of ships (Molenaar,
1998 and Ornitz& Champ, 2002).

2.7.6

Oil and Shipping Industry Organizations/Associations The role of

oil and shipping industry organizations/associations in providing technical
expertise & guidance and support in oil spill response cannot be discounted.
They play a leading part in ensuring compliance of existing regulatory
requirements as well as in developing innovative techniques, systems and
procedures. The relevant organizations are International Association of
Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO), International Petroleum
Industry Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA), International
Tanker

Owners

Pollution

Federation

(ITOPF)

and

Oil

Companies

International Marine Forum (OCIMF).

2.7.7

International Maritime Organization (IMO)

IMO has played

an active role in developing instruments to contribute towards framing a
comprehensive policy for marine pollution issues in addition to encouraging
technical assistance for capacity building and cooperative arrangements
among member states. Thus, it has a prominent position in evolving a
successful and responsive global oil pollution response regime (Molenaar,
1998).
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2.8

Oil Spill Response Techniques
2.8.1

Tiered Preparedness and Response

The oil spill response is usually organized in a structured tiered preparedness
and response approach to ensure establishment of oil spill preparedness and
undertaking a response where the potential oil spill incidents are categorized
in terms of their potential severity and the capabilities that need to be in place
to respond (IPIECA, 2007). Thus, the concept has been considered as a
function of size and location of a potential oil spill and has been defined in
tiers as depicted in Figure 3.
TIER3

Large spill

TIER 2

Medium spill

Small spill

TIER 1

Local
Vicinity
Remote
Proximity to Operations

Figure 3 : Tiered preparedness and response.
Source: Guide to Tiered Preparedness and Response, International Petroleum Industry
Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA), 2007
Tier 1

Operational spills at an operator’s facilities who is expected to

respond with own resources.

Tier 2

Spills likely to extend outside the Tier 1 response area and may

be larger in size requiring additional resources.

Tier 3

Oil spills causing major impact due to their scale and likelihood

and demand substantial resources from national and international sources.
The process of defining these tiers of capability and their boundaries calls for
a risk management study to ensure appropriate risk mitigation strategies
(IPIECA, 2008).
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2.8.2

Oil Spill Response Technologies

The capability to respond effectively to an oil spill is a combination of three
factors – physical conditions at the time of an accident /spill, suitability,
capability and availability of technology deployed and the skills, training and
readiness of an organization / people responsible for combating the spill (US
Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 1990). Thus, the technology
available provides the limitations, if any, for any oil spill response operation to
be successful. The oil spill response technology may be broadly divided into
following categories:
-

According

Mechanical Response

to

Doeffer

(1992),

this

involves mechanical recovery of spilled oil by a variety of techniques. It
consists of containment booms which provide a mechanical barrier to floating
oil by extending above and below the waterline. The clean up operations after
containment of oil are carried out by removal of oil from the water surface by
using mechanical devices called skimmers. These skimmers work on the
principle of gravity (weir type), oleophile (sorbent type), suction, centrifugal
and submersion and are suitable for different types of oil to be collected. There
are also specially designed oil spill response vessels capable of operating in
open ocean (US Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 1990).In
addition, certain sorbent materials are also used to remove oil from the surface
of water when oil is free floating and close to the shore or stranded on the
shore.
-

Chemical Response This involves the use of certain chemicals to act

as surface tension modifiers and inhibit the spread of oil. However, the use of
dispersants to mitigate oil spills has to be decided taking into account many
factors including closeness to coast and depth of water.

-

In-situ Burning

Sometimes, burning the oil at sea (in-situ

burning) is also resorted for oil spills in open sea and occasionally on stranded
oil on shorelines.
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-

Shoreline Clean-Up When the oil contaminates the shoreline, it

requires specialized equipments for clean up in addition to conventional
manpower intensive manual cleaning and thus can be classified as a different
response technique than a mechanical or chemical response undertaken at sea.
It also involves the use of bio-agents to accelerate the natural biodegradation
process of oil.
2.8.3

Oil Spill Response – Contingency Planning

While the technical aspects of dealing with a spill are clearly important, the
effectiveness of the response of a major pollution event will ultimately depend
upon the quality of the contingency plan and of the organization and control of
the various aspects of the clean-up operation (ITOPF Handbook, 2009).
However, it needs to be remembered that contingency planning in oil spill
response involves measures of readiness which include recognizing the need
for preparedness , allocating resources , gaining participation and then ensure
continued effort, testing, evaluation and improvement as depicted in Figure 4
(IOSC,2008).

Figure 4 : Oil spill readiness.
Source: Assessment of Oil Spill Response Capabilities: A Proposed International
Guide for Oil Spill Response Planning and Readiness Assessments, International Oil
Spill Conference, 2008
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Although there are requirements for such plans onboard a ship (tankers and certain
non-tankers) in compliance with MARPOL 73/78 and the ISM guidelines, the most
important aspect relates to the emergency preparedness of the various coastal states
that are expected to build up and maintain emergency response capability for an oil
spill as per OPRC, 1990.
The process of contingency planning involves three broad steps whereby first, the
information is gathered, then interpreted and developed into appropriate strategies
leading finally to the drafting of operational procedures. Figure 5 provides a
schematic representation of this process.
Information Gathering

Strategy Development

Risk Assessment

Organisation

•Oil Properties

Responsibilities

•Current with wind
data

Strategy Options

Communication
•Reporting

•Sea conditions
•Movements and fate

Operational Plan

NEBA

•Historic data

•Assessment

Spill Scenarios

•Documentation

Environment at Risk
Tiered Response

•Ecological

•Mobilisation

Resources
Waste Plan

•Industrial
Priorities
Response Objectives

•Amenity

Review
Updating

Liaison, training, exercising and updating are essential

Figure 5 : Contingency planning process.
Source: A Guide to Contingency Planning for Oil Spills on Water, International
Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA), 2000
Some of the significant features of the plan include the following: (ITOPF; IPIECA
etc.)
-

Use of risk assessment techniques for defining risk criteria for
resources, environment etc.

-

Training and review of procedures is essential for continuous
improvement.

-

Selection and limitation of response techniques to be determined in
various scenarios.

-

Cooperative approach by all parties for effective response.
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-

Defining termination of clean up operation and final disposal options is
critical.

2.9

Oil Pollution Compensation Regime

The peculiarities of an oil pollution response with very large financial costs involved
in clean up, recouping economic loss and environmental restoration came into
prominence in 1967 with the Torrey Canyon disaster which defied conventional
liability and compensation rules for damage. Thus, it acted as a catalyst for the
development of an elaborate international regime to provide compensation for
pollution damage caused by spills from oil tankers in the form of the International
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage,1969 and International
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil
Pollution Damage,1971 ( Jacobsson,2003).

2.9.1

International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution

Damage, 1969(CLC) --

This governs the liability of ship-owners for oil

pollution damage and lays down the principle of strict liability and
compulsory liability insurance. However, they are allowed to limit their
liability in certain circumstances to an amount related to the tonnage of the
ship (Faure & HU, 2006). The convention was amended in 1992.

2.9.2

International

Convention

on

the

Establishment

of

an

International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 1971 This established a system for compensating the victims of oil pollution
when they are inadequately compensated under the CLC. It established an
International Oil Pollution Compensation (IOPC) Fund to be managed by an
inter-governmental organization and financed by contributions from specified
oil receivers depending upon the quantities of oil received by them after sea
transport. The convention was amended in 1992 and further a supplementary
fund was also created in 2003 for additional compensation. The operation of
the scheme is represented in the Figure 6.
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Third tier of compensation
Supplementary
Fund

SUPPLEMENTARY FUND
PROTOCOL
In force from 3 March 2005

Up to about US$1
billion

Levies on oil
receivers in
Supplementary fund
member states

Up to about US$306
million

Second tier of compensation
IOPC Fund 1992

1992 FUND CONVENTION

Levies on oil
receivers in 1992
Fund member
states
Up to about US$135
million, dependent on the
size of the ship

Tanker Owner
(Legally liable
party)

Primary tier of compensation
Insurance

1992 CIVIL LIABILITY
CONVENTION

(P & I Club)

SOURCE OF
MONEY

WHO PAYS

Figure 6 : Three levels of compensation.
Source: Action against oil pollution, International Petroleum Industry Environmental
Conservation Association (IPIECA), 2005
2.9.3

International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil

Pollution Damage, 2001

The compensation regime for oil pollution

damage mainly focused only on tankers for oil carried as cargo. However, the
drastic increase in the size of all types of ships has enhanced the potential for a
major pollution incident being experienced even due to a bunker oil spill by a
large non tanker ship. Thus, the International Convention on Civil Liability for
Bunker Oil Pollution Damage was developed which recently entered into force
in November 2008. It provides a mechanism for compensation to victims who
suffer damage caused by spills of oil carried as fuel in ships bunkers. It is
modeled on the CLC, 1969 maintaining the principles of strict liability and
compulsory insurance (IMO, 2009).

2.9.4

The United States is not a party to the

Oil Pollution Act, 1990

international compensation regime discussed in the preceding paragraphs. The
Oil Pollution Act, 1990 provides the general framework for the same; however,
individual states sometimes have more stringent oil spill laws (ITOPF, 2009).
The potential compensation available under OPA, 90 is similar to that of the
international compensation regime (IPIECA, 2005).
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2.10

Trends in Oil Spill Incidents

There is no comprehensive global database available which maintains
statistics of oil spill incidents caused by shipping. However, the database
maintained by ITOPF covering oil spills caused by oil tankers only is
generally accepted as a reference by everyone for discussion on trends in oil
spill incidents over the years and gauges the effectiveness of preventive and
response measures. Table 2 shows that there has been a significant decrease in
the number of large oil spills in the last thirty years and 2008 witnessed the
least number of spills over 7 tonnes.
Table 2 : Number of spills over 7 tonnes.
Year
1970

7-700
> 700 Year
tonnes tonnes
6
29 1983

7-700
> 700 Year
tonnes tonnes
52
13 1996

7-700
> 700
tonnes tonnes
20
3

1971

18

14 1984

25

8 1997

28

10

1972

48

27 1985

31

8 1998

25

5

1973

27

32 1986

27

7 1999

19

6

1974

89

28 1987

27

10 2000

19

4

1975

95

22 1988

11

10 2001

16

3

1976

67

26 1989

32

13 2002

12

3

1977

68

17 1990

51

14 2003

15

4

1978

58

23 1991

29

7 2004

16

5

1979

60

34 1992

31

10 2005

21

3

1980

52

13 1993

31

11 2006

11

4

1981

54

7 1994

26

9 2007

10

4

1982

45

4 1995

20

3 2008

7

1

Source: Oil tanker spill statistics 2008, ITOPF (2009b)
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The seaborne trade of oil has been growing continuously with the consequent increase
in movements of tankers. However, despite this increase in oil trading, a downward
trend in oil spillage has been observed as is evident in Figure 7.

Figure 7 : Seaborne oil trade and number of tanker spills over 7 tonnes, 1970-2008.

Source: ITOPF (2009b).
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CHAPTER 3
NORTHERN INDIAN OCEAN-RISK PROFILE FOR OIL
POLLUTION AND ITS IMPACT
3.1

Introduction

The Indian Ocean has been defined as the area between latitudes 25 degrees north and
40 degrees south and longitudes 45 degrees east and 115 degrees east (Figure 8).
However, the focus of this dissertation is limited to its northern part due to specific
factors highlighted in succeeding paragraphs. The Northern Indian Ocean
incorporating the Arabian Sea surrounded by the landmass of the Indian subcontinent,
Middle East Asia and the eastern Africa has unique oceanographical characteristics
and experiences high levels of seaborne traffic.

Figure 8 : Area covered by Indian Ocean.
Source: www.uknetguide.co.uk/.../map_indian_ocean.gif, 2009
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Prior to the discussion on the risk profile for oil pollution in the area, the rationale of
risk management has to be understood.
3.2

Rationale of Risk Management

Risk management involves a process where the risks associated with a particular
activity or situations are studied in a particular context focussing on development of
strategies for handling them. These broadly relate to measures applied for assessment
of risk including identification of hazards & their evaluation and estimation of risk,
the evaluation of risk and the risk control options and then approaching to effectively
manage these risks (Elmer, 2003). An effective risk management strategy incorporates
determining priority of the risks accordingly to their potential seriousness in terms of
damage caused & likelihood of occurrence and not only developing control measures
but also implement them by close monitoring thereby achieving the goal of proper
risk management. Thus, it acts as a tool for maintaining an acceptable level of safety
(Chantelauve, 2003).
It is important to note that the definition of risk incorporates not only the probability
of occurrence of a hazardous situation, but also the consequences of that occurrence.
Thus, all the factors that have an impact on these two domains have to be taken into
account while developing a risk profile for the Northern Indian Ocean. Thus, the
various factors will first be discussed in detail. Thereafter, their significance and interrelationship with each other will be critically analysed to develop a risk profile. These
factors are now discussed in detail.
3.3

Maritime Trade and shipping traffic

The skewed distribution of oil reserves in the world is striking as the major producers
are not the major consuming nations, thus necessitating transport of large quantities10
of oil across the globe. The world’s main oil producing countries are located in the
Middle East and thus a vast amount of oil originating from the oil terminals at their
ports flows towards the consuming nations transiting the ocean. There are two
important transportation routes for oil tankers in the Northern Indian Ocean. One of
10

More than half of the global oil production is transported through oil tankers, Energy Information
Administration, US, 2007.
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these routes passes across the Arabian Sea along the Indian EEZ, round Sri Lanka, via
the southern Bay of Bengal to the Far East. The other route goes through the strait of
Mozambique, round South Africa to the western hemisphere (Gupta & Qasim, 2001).
Figure 9 provides details concerning seaborne crude oil trade routes in the world.
Seaborne Crude Oil
Trade Map 2006
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Figure 9: Movement of oil through sea.
Source: Lloyd’s Marine Intelligence Unit, 2006
It is estimated that about a half to two-thirds of the global marine transport of oil is
carried along these two tanker routes. Although, generally not many major accidents
or oil spill incidents have been observed and not too frequently, there have
nonetheless been a few accidents in the area. However, the operational discharges
from ships including bilge, bunker and ballast washings also contribute significantly
towards the quantity of oil entering the ocean.
According to the research carried out by Japan Oceanographic Data Centre on the
presence of oil slicks in the Northern Indian Ocean, as quoted by Gupta & Qasim,
2001, about 83.5 percent of the total observations turned out to be positive. The data
of all observations in the entire Indian Ocean is depicted in Figure -10 (Qasim, 1998).
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Figure 10 : Observations on oil slicks and other floating pollutants every 5 degree square in
Indian Ocean.

Source: The Indian Ocean –A perspective, Sengupta & Desa, 2001
This also reinforces the fact that the oil slicks are quite frequent along the tanker
routes of the Northern Indian Ocean, while south of the equator, there is hardly any
trace of oil pollution. This analysis fairly corresponds to the density of oil tanker
traffic as depicted in Figure 1 where the region experiences one of the highest
concentrations of tanker traffic in the world.
In addition to the tankers, the region also witnesses other shipping traffic transiting
the area. The conventional traffic has also experienced a drastic increase due to the
economic resurgence of the surrounding countries especially India and other Asian
economies in recent years .The growing need for movements of more merchandise
across the shipping lanes to support the increasing appetite of industries and
consumers has resulted in escalating the overall conventional shipping traffic in the
area. This increased traffic combined with existing heavy tanker traffic contributes to
the high density of shipping in area and further enhances the risk of marine accidents.

30

3.4

Global Hub for Ships Recycling

The region can also be termed as the hub of ship recycling industries in the world with
major recycling yards located on the Indian subcontinent. The combination of
increased demand of steel for industries, availability of low cost labour and minimal
safety and environmental standards has catapulted the region into a major recycling
destination. The leading recycling countries in the world are Bangladesh, India and
Pakistan as depicted in Figure –11.

Figure 11 : Leading ship recycling countries.
Source: A statistical overview of ship recycling, Mikelis, 2007
During 2008, a total of 654 vessels with a tonnage of 11.5 million dwt were reported
to be broken up which was 58 percent more than that in 2007 (ISL, 2009b).The
phasing out of single hull tankers from the world fleet as per the schedule adopted by
IMO will also drastically increase recycling of these vessels in coming years. The
current economic crisis has also forced the ship-owners to consider scrapping ships as
an option to ride the bottom phase of the shipping market cycle.
A majority share of these vessels land in the Indian subcontinent for recycling
transiting the region. It is important to note that , most of such vessels proceed under
own power on their last voyage to the final destination in a ship recycling yard and
barely adhere to the safety and environment protection regulations including adequate
manning required by the relevant international instruments. Thus, it increases the risk
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of marine casualty in the region due to grounding, collision etc. resulting from the
operation of these unseaworthy ships. Though, no major casualty or oil spill incident
has been reported involving such vessels, a number of minor incidents have been
observed including some near-misses. The countries have undertaken a few measures
to ensure knowledge of the condition and voyage details of these vessels in advance to
minimise such incidents. However, these are generally routine, administrative
procedures and given less priority by the maritime safety and environment protection
administration. Consequently, these vessels pose a certain risk for being involved in a
marine accident especially during bad weather or the local monsoon season.

3.5

Ecologically Sensitive Area

The region encompasses unique marine ecosystems supporting rich biodiversity of
flora and fauna in addition to providing habitats for important species to flourish.
Though a majority of the world’s mangrove area (over 47 percent) containing 85
percent of the world’s mangrove species lie in the Indian Ocean, the northern part
accounts for a significantly less proportion of these habitats. However, there are
significant mangrove areas located around the coasts of India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka
with scattered areas around the arid regions in the northernmost part close to Yemen,
Oman and UAE ( Kathiresan & Rajendran, 2004 ).It is important to note that most of
these regions lie close to the shipping routes transgressing the area thereby posing an
enhanced risk regarding oil pollution severely affecting these marine habitats.
Further, a number of sensitive and fragile ecosystems e.g. coastal and backwater
lagoons, mudflats and estuaries are also located around the area (Schwartz, 2005).
These ecosystems support a fine balance of a variety of species to coexist and
sometimes also integrate breeding grounds. The area also encloses the low lying atolls
on the Lakshadweep- Chagos ridge with abundant coral reefs. These areas have been
found to contain one of the largest numbers of species in the region (McClanahan,
Sheppard & Obura, 2000). It reinforces their importance not only as an environmental
conservation issue but also as a major contributor towards coastal economy of these
areas which are highly dependent on tourism. Thus, any oil spill in the area is likely to
have a devastating effect over the region’s fragile coastal economies.
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Since the northern part of the ocean is landlocked from three sides by the continental
masses of Asia and Africa, any major oil spill in the area is likely to persist for a
longer duration of time compared to a relatively open ocean in the southern part
where it may be easier to be drifted away by ocean currents and wind.
Though there are no designated Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSAs) in the
Northern Indian Ocean, there are many designated marine protected areas especially
along the coasts of India and Pakistan. These areas are critical both in terms of
ecosystem processes and its properties. These are crucial to the health of marine
ecosystems due to their highly productive capacity to contribute to the food chain and
support breeding cycles, spawning grounds, migratory corridors etc. (McNeely,
Harrision & Dingwall, 1994).

3.6

Geographical Factors Affecting the Risk of Oil Pollution

The area comprises a geographical region which is subject to various weather
phenomena resulting in frequent harsh weather conditions. The effect of the tropical
monsoon season coincides with the annual cycle of origin of tropical cyclones, thus
accentuating the combined effect to create extreme weather in the area. Though the
number of cyclones generated in this region is comparatively much less than other
regions of the world, their impacts are relatively very high and devastating especially
close to coast (SAARC, 2008). Incidentally, it has also been observed that during the
past three decades, the number of severe tropical cyclones (Category 4 and above) has
increased sharply from 8 percent to 25 percent in the Northern Indian Ocean (SAARC,
2007). This will definitely result in directly increasing the hazard exposure in open
areas in ocean as well as in coastal regions where the effects are further compounded
due to the vulnerability for development of storm surges. The climate change and the
rise in sea temperatures will lead to more intense cyclones which may occur even in
regions which have not historically suffered cyclones (United Nations, 2007). Thus,
the high traffic density in combination

with the landlocked ocean area and the

probability of increased frequency of severe weather phenomena enhances the risk of
a major disaster in the region. Incidentally, the 2006 season witnessed 18 incidents of
grounding or sinking of ships in Indian waters, which demonstrates the gravity of the
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problem. Details of the incidents are given in Figure 12. It is clear that incidents are
spread out along the both the coasts with a larger number occurring on the west coast
of India (ICG, 2007).

Figure 12 : Incidents of grounding or sinking of ships in Indian waters.
Source: Blue Waters, Indian Coast Guard, 2007
Although, these incidents have fortunately resulted in only minor oil spills in some
cases, the Tasman Spirit oil tanker which grounded off Karachi harbour in Pakistan in
2003 during severe weather in the monsoon season resulted in a major oil spill in the
area.
Thus, the vulnerability of shipping traffic to these specific weather and geographical
conditions reinforces the requirement for a comprehensive strategy for reducing the
risk by improving forecasting methods, dissemination techniques for weather
information, arrangements for providing assistance to ships in emergency situations,
e.g. places of refuge etc. and capacity building in oil spill response in surrounding
countries. However, there is no common national or regional initiative on these lines
developed in the region. Therefore, it raises the risk profile of the region against a
marine casualty in general, and oil spill incident in particular.
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3.7

Inefficient implementation of pollution prevention measures

It is widely accepted that adequate enforcement of oil pollution prevention measures
contributes positively in minimising the risk of pollution and its consequences. These
measures include not only the legislative instruments and policy directives, but also
effective monitoring activities such as inspections and measuring compliance.
However, it is important to note that the efficacy of these measures should focus on
the intentional as well as accidental discharges from the ships.
3.7.1

Older and Single Hull Vessels

The countries surrounding the northern Indian Ocean consist of a wide range
of maritime states with differing levels of marine activities. However, a
majority of countries have a relatively less stringent inspection regime, both as
flag state implementation (FSI) and as the port state control (PSC). Thus, it is
a frequent and prevalent practice by ship-owners to deploy such ships in the
area which are older and relatively sub-standard ships. These ships are
generally withdrawn from the highly regulated and stringent areas like Europe,
to take advantage of the inefficient inspection regime prevailing in the region.
Though , there have been a few countries like India which has set an age
restriction of 25 years for foreign ships entering its territorial waters, most of
the countries have no such measures to regulate quality of ships in their waters.
Even in the case of India, the effectiveness of the ban is questionable as it
excludes many categories of ships including oil and product tankers, and also
exempts Indian registered ships (WSJ, 2006)
Further, the region has also not witnessed any activity towards regulating the
single hull tankers transiting the area. Though, there have been basic
arrangements for adhering to the IMO mandated deadline for phasing out of
these tankers, the countries have not displayed any proactive approach in this
field compared to certain countries in Europe e.g. France, Italy, Spain, etc.,
which have banned single hull tankers from entering their ports if they are
carrying specific types of cargo regarded as worst pollutants (INTERTANKO,
2009).
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3.7.2

Provision of Reception Facilities

A major contribution towards reduction of marine oil pollution, including the
avoidance of many illegal discharges, would be the provision of proper waste
reception facilities – adequate in capacity & scope, affordable and readily
accessible (Swift, 2005). The major ports and terminals in the region generally
provide for a provision for such facilities. However, most of the ports and
terminals either have a nominal or minimal facilities or lack sufficient
capacities. Further, there are considerable shortcomings in enforcing the
provisions regarding illegal discharges by the port states thereby providing no
deterrence to the crew of the ships against such intentional acts or discharges.
Thus, there have been concerns expressed recently about the number of illegal
discharges from the large volume of shipping within the region (Ingole &
Sivadas, 2007).
It is evident that there is a direct relationship between the adequate
provisioning of accessible facilities for reception of oily wastes at ports and
terminals and the incidents of intentional discharges at sea. However, it has to
be remembered that a majority of shipping in the region including the tankers
is a transiting traffic and do not enter into the ports located within the area.
Thus, the contention of the argument for sufficient reception facilities has to
be critically evaluated and weighed against this traffic not being affected by
such efforts. Incidentally, the positive concerns towards this issue to prevent
illegal discharges are likely to contribute towards raising awareness about the
environment protection and generate an encouraging response on such matters.
It would also promote the development of a mechanism supporting prevention
of such acts by all ships including inbound, outbound or transiting traffic in
the area.
3.7.3

Lack of Strong Enforcement Mechanism

The region does not have any national or coordinated mechanism or agency
that effectively monitors the intentional discharges, investigates the defaulters
and undertakes enforcement of sanctions or penal actions. For example, in the
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case of the United States, the Coast Guard is highly effective and empowered
to take such measures and is authorised to even impose certain monetary fines
on the polluters (Cohen, 2004). Most of the countries in Europe, Japan and
Australia also have regular surveillance arrangements by their respective
agencies to monitor the area around their coasts for any oil spills including
illegal discharges by ships. Any oil slick located at sea is traced back to the
defaulting ship and processed for legal or monetary sanctions. Such
coordinated acts incorporating regular patrol and follow up not only create a
deterrence effect on subsequent defaulters but also contribute in inculcating a
sense of fairness towards those ships that comply with the accepted
environment friendly policies and regulations. Though there are national
agencies and organisations responsible for oil spill response in respective
countries in the region, most of these neither possess technical resources nor
are legally empowered to initiate these proactive measures.
3.8

Developing Economies – Competition for Resources

Though the economic prosperity of a country or a region does not directly affect the
risk profile for an oil pollution incident, it may be considered as an influencing factor
while evaluating the consequences part of the risk equation utilized for undertaking
risk assessment in the area. Thus, a similar incident of oil pollution may have vastly
different consequences at two different places depending upon the effect it causes on
the economy of the coastal community and the resources available for mitigating its
effects.
The Northern Indian Ocean region is surrounded by countries which are largely
developing nations with many of them struggling to balance the need of resources for
basic developmental need and effectively meeting the environmental concerns. They
have a large population which is depending on the sea and coastal areas for their
survival. Millions of people (more than 2.5 million in India) are directly or indirectly
engaged in the production of fish with a significant percentage of fishermen in the
world located in this region (FAO, 2008).
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Further, Maldives, a small island country, totally depends on coastal tourism for
major part of the revenues to fund its national budget. In addition, other countries in
the region also have a significant tourism industry engaged in coastal tourism with
millions of people involved in these activities. Thus, any major oil spill incident will
result in not only an environmental disaster in the region but also in devastating effect
towards these economic activities. Infact, the economic effect may have a longer term
implication than the environmental one as, even after the restoration of the
environment, the lack of resources would severely restrict the revival of coastal
communities towards sustainable economic enterprises. Though, the relatively
prosperous regions are also likely to suffer enormous damage, the effects would be
much lesser due to availability of resources and diversified economic activities. In
contrast, most of the population in these developing countries under risk are involved
in subsistence activities and have limited or no alternative source for their livelihood
in case of any deterioration of sea and coastal areas. Thus, such an incident can wipe
out the livelihood of millions of people.
The lack of resources also severely restricts quick and efficient response strategies in
case of an incident thereby accentuating the negative impact and delaying restoration
and recovery. The provisioning of necessary infrastructure for dealing with such
contingency would suffer due to high cost involved and lack of technical expertise.It
is obvious that the constraints of resources also have a significant effect in overall
perception of the society about the risk involved in a particular scenario depending
upon its relative importance. Thus, the issue of environment protection in general and
marine oil pollution in particular is usually not considered as a priority area vis-a–vis
the requirement of resources for critical problems such as education, healthcare, food
security and child welfare. The key validation regarding poverty alleviation taking
precedence over other activities is illustrated by Table 3 which lists the human
development index ranks of the selected countries in the area along with the
percentage of population below the national poverty line.
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Table 3 : Percentage of population below poverty line & HDI index rank.
Sr no.

Country

1.

Bangladesh

Population
poverty line
40.0

below HDI Rank

2.

India

28.6

128

3.

Maldives

NA

100

4.

Pakistan

32.6

136

5.

Sri Lanka

25.0

99

6.

Yemen

41.8

153

140

Source: Compiled by Author with data obtained from Human Development report
2007-2008, United Nations Development Programme, 2007.
This competition for resources negatively influences the provisioning of funds and
efforts towards essential but relatively less popular activities such as pollution,
environment protection, etc.
The overall effect of these circumstances impinges on the risk matrix and
progressively increases the risk in respect of an oil pollution incident by improperly
amplifying the consequences domain. Moreover, the intricate web of interdependent
factors creates a situation where the economic prosperity of the state plays a
considerable part in developing a mechanism for oil pollution prevention and
response in a strange but unique way.

3.9

Geo-Political Factors Affecting Oil Pollution Risk

The region encompasses distinctive geopolitical factors that also generate an influence
in the development of risk profile of an oil pollution incident. The area towards the
eastern boundary comprising South Asian countries of the Indian subcontinent is
politically stable and does not possess any significant issues of concern. However, the
countries in the northern part comprising Middle East are relatively volatile with not
only internal but also external political tensions prevailing. There have been a number
of major events that impacted shipping traffic in the area over a period of time. One of
the most important and uncharacteristic development was experienced during the
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closure of the Suez Canal first in 1956 and then for a much longer period between
1967 and 1975 (Suez Canal Authority, 2009). Thus, all the shipping traffic in the area
was routed around the African continent thereby affecting traffic density in the
Northern Indian Ocean. Though, the political and diplomatic considerations have
changed significantly in today’s context, the fragile relationship between Israel and
the Arab world even today, point towards the possibility of such closures again. As
much of the tanker traffic passes through the canal, any disruption in the canal
passage in turn affects the shipping in area. Apart from these closures of the canal due
to political tensions involving the host country, Egypt, the prolonged war between
Iran and Iraq in the 1980s also resulted in the traffic in the canal being affected
considerably. Incidentally , the region still remains in a fluid state , if not similarly
volatile as earlier, with

political and diplomatic tensions and stand-offs quite

common among neighbouring countries .
The intricacies of the geo-political factors transgressing environmental arena were
specifically evident during the First Gulf War in 1991 when Iraqi soldiers dumped
thousands of tonnes of oil from a loading dock in Kuwait into the Persian Gulf. This
irrational act resulted in one of the largest oil spills ever in the recorded history
(Ingole & Sivadas, 2007). The effects of this spill were experienced largely off the
coasts of Saudi Arabia but the effects were felt throughout the region, beyond the
Gulf area even up to the Indian coast and created long term ecological, environmental
and economic consequences.
The region also experiences an unusual situation in respect of Somalia, where no
political governing administration retains control over the state. Thus, the state is
functioning without an effective government for the last many years, thereby leaving
a large coastal area and surrounding waters without any control and monitoring. This
gap in the implementation of maritime safety and environment protection measures in
such a large area definitely affects the adjoining areas in the region in ensuring
compliance of such measures.
The current situation in Somalia has resulted in another problem affecting the
maritime field. There has been a sudden jump in the incidents of piracy and hijacking
of vessels transiting the area and now it has the notoriety of being the hot spot of
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maritime piracy. The incidents have become so common that many shipping
companies have started considering routing of their vessels around the Cape of Good
Hope and avoiding the area completely. Thus, these events have succeeded in creating
an effect in influencing the traffic pattern in the region in the short term. Though,
these incidents have not resulted in any casualty to the ship resulting in collision,
grounding or sinking, the frequent use of heavy military style weapons like rocket
launchers, heavy machine guns, grenades, etc. by these pirates might sometime result
in damage to the ships hull resulting in leakage of bunker or cargo oil leading to
catastrophic results.
The circumstances become more complicated due to notable existence of terrorist
activities in some countries of the region. Though lying dormant in recent years, the
bombing of USS Cole at Aden harbour in Yemen in 2000 ( Figure 13 )and of the
French oil tanker Limburg in the Gulf of Aden in 2002 highlights the risk of such
events.

Figure 13 : USS Cole at Aden harbour after the terrorist attack in 2000.
Source: www.globalsecurity.org, 2009
Any such terrorist attack on a super tanker might result in disastrous consequences in
the area. The strategy of a terrorist organisation to engage in an activity with
maximum effect for a small effort to have a global publicity compliments the
selection of targeting maritime shipping, especially a VLCC, in area.
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Figure 14 : Geo-political factors influencing risk of oil pollution in Northern
Indian Ocean.
Source: Author, 2009
The combination of politically and diplomatically fragile relationships among
neighbouring states, a failed state, piracy infested waters , conflict prone area and
probable terrorist activities create unique geo-political conditions unlikely to be
duplicated anywhere in the world as shown in Figure14. Though , the probability of
any of these factors is quite low or even negligible in certain cases , the high costs
involved in the consequences of even a single event definitely forces us to take it into
consideration for developing risk matrix in the area. A single event has the potential
to topple the balance of the risk equation evolved after careful research of all
conventional factors as these asymmetric factors provide an uneven and lopsided
weightage towards determination of the risk.
3.10

Developing Risk Profile by Analysing Contribution of Various Factors

The discussion in the preceding paragraphs highlighted some of the key parameters
that influence the development of risk profile for an oil pollution incident in the
Northern Indian Ocean. These factors traverse through a wide domain for
identification of hazardous situations that impact on the probability of the occurrence
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and the severity of the consequences of such an incident. Though some of these
factors seem to suggest an independent profile or existence, most of them actually
define a relationship of interdependency with a few others. Thus, the analysis of the
overall situation needs to address the issue in the context of individual aspects
correlating with the combination of these factors.
The most striking aspect among the information available about the region is the
existence of one of the busiest shipping traffic area in the world. This is specifically
evident from the two major tanker routes passing through the area. It is also
undisputable that both of these routes together carry a significant proportion of oil
coming out from the ports of the largest producers of oil in the world located in the
Middle East. Hence, the presence of a large number of tankers transiting the area at
any given time certainly contributes in enhancing the risk of any marine accident. The
tanker traffic is again combining with the other normal shipping in the area to create
even more dense shipping in the region, thus, further enhancing this risk. However,
the risk for the marine accident needs to be distinguished from the risk of oil pollution.
The two are definitely interrelated but are not the same. The risk equation regarding
probability and consequences can be applied in such a scenario to determine the
difference between the two. In this case, not only there is high probability of a marine
accident occurring in the area due to high traffic density, but also the presence of a
disproportionately large number of tankers among these ships drastically increases the
probability of an oil pollution incident. Incidentally, such an incident is likely to be
much more severe due to the likelihood a large quantity of oil spilled at sea from the
oil cargo tanks compared to the situation when a non-tanker ship is involved in such
an accident. Thus, due to this cumulative effect, the risk for oil pollution becomes
relatively much higher than the risk for a marine accident in the area.
However, this discussion does not preclude the contention that traffic density alone
cannot be considered as a predominant factor in causing an accident at sea. It can
surely be argued that there are other contributing factors equally or at least
significantly important which influence the risk of an accident. Thus, we have to
consider these factors in our area now to determine how much they contribute towards
increasing or decreasing this risk.
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The most important of these factors is the weather conditions experienced at sea. The
vagaries of the monsoon season and the tropical cyclones have been discussed earlier
which generate severe weather conditions annually in Northern Indian Ocean. Despite
the contention of an increase in the harsh weather conditions due to the increase in the
frequency of the severe tropical storms in the recent years, it needs to be considered
against the fact that the average weather conditions experienced in the region are
relatively less severe than those prevailing in other oceanic areas. The root of this
argument is based on two main aspects which define the weather conditions at sea –
generation of cyclonic circulations leading to very rough weather and the average
wave height experienced in the area. Let us look into these aspects more closely to
draw a justified inference. Firstly, the region generates the lowest number of cyclones
compared to any of the other oceanic regions (less than 4 percent). Further, even after
the increase in the frequency of severe cyclones reported in recent years, there are still
only 7 such cyclones (category 4 and above) experienced in the last 15 years. In
comparison, the Southern Indian Ocean generated 50 such cyclones in the same
period (SAARC, 2007). The number of severe cyclones generated in various oceanic
areas in the last 15 years is shown in the Table 4.
Table 4: Change in number and percentage of Hurricane/Cyclone.
1975-1989
Basin

Number

1900-2004

Percentage

Number

Percentage

East Pacific Ocean

36

25

49

36

West Pacific Ocean

85

25

118

41

North Atlantic

16

20

25

25

South West Pacific

10

12

22

28

North Indian

1

8

7

25

South Indian

23

18

50

34

Source: South Asian Disaster Report, 2007
Secondly, the average wave height experienced at sea in the region is relatively quite
low at 2 to 3 metres which indicates that the general sea conditions prevailing in the
area are moderately calm and not severely rough except during cyclonic disturbances.
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In comparison, the south Indian Ocean experiences the biggest waves on the planet
averaging up to 7 to 8 metres with occasional waves twice this height. The northern
Atlantic Ocean also witnesses waves of average height of 5 metres (Anthoni, 2000).
The average heights of the waves in various regions of the world are depicted in
Figure 15.

Figure 15 : Average heights of the waves in various regions of the world.
Source: Oceanography: waves theory and principles of waves, how they work and
what causes them, Anthoni, 2000
Thus, it is observed from Figure 15 and Table 4 that the northern Indian Ocean is a
relatively calm sea area where the weather and sea conditions are way below being
abnormal and harsh for a major part of the year. These conditions may worsen for a
short duration of time during an occasional (but not very frequent) storm generated in
the area. Hence, the weather conditions do not significantly contribute to the risk of an
oil pollution incident in the region.
The quality of the shipping in terms of sub standard ships operating in the area is also
one of the important considerations in determining the risk of an accident. It can be
regarded as an independent factor as well as having a certain influence on the traffic
density. The presence of major ship recycling centres in the Indian subcontinent leads
to a constant flow of ships on their last voyages passing through the area. Most of
these ships certainly can be classified as fairly unseaworthy creating a hazardous
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situation. With the increase in the number of these ships due to the requirement of
phasing out of the single hull tankers, the problem is expected to become more
compounded in the short term. However, the threat posed by these vessels has to be
examined and evaluated with respect to their impact on the overall risk situation in the
area. It is estimated that over 50000 ships pass through this region every year. On the
other hand, only a few hundred vessels (less than 1 percent) transit the area bound for
the recycling yards. Further, most of these ships carry a quantity of fuel oil barely
sufficient to meet the demand for undertaking their last voyage and do not in itself
pose a risk of a large oil spill in case of an accident due to their un-seaworthiness.
Thus, they can cause significant damage only if they are involved in a major collision
with other vessels operating in area causing damage leading to oil pollution from
these vessels. However, with such a negligible presence, the probability of such an
event is extremely low, though consequences of which may certainly be much higher.
Thus, it is fair to consider the risk contribution by these vessels to be reasonably low.
The other aspects which impinge on the quality of shipping are the comparative
lacuna in inspection regime by maritime states, limitation of policy initiatives to root
out old and substandard ships and insufficient enforcement powers. These issues are
related not only to the technical expertise and legitimacy of intent of various countries
involved for substantive action, but also the economic constraints and developmental
pressures not related to maritime interests. The reality of environment or maritime
issue being sidelined for other priority areas needs to be accepted for these developing
countries. Thus, the overall impact of such a situation is certainly a negative influence
on the risk profile in this case. It is especially true in the case of intentional discharges
by ships due to insufficient capacities in reception facilities or flaccid enforcement
mechanisms. The combined effect can be considered to pose a relatively medium risk
for an oil spill incident in the area.
The existence of ecologically sensitive area in the region has been discussed and the
hazard to these areas cannot be always quantified in terms of economic and social
costs. The comparison of the area with other oceanic areas of the world brings out that
the biodiversity and marine ecosystems existing in the area conform to the world
average. Though there are no PSSAs designated in the region, and the presence of
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mangroves or other such sensitive habitats are also limited, the long term impact of
any oil spill on them makes for a high risk criterion.
The presence of unique combination of geo-political factors in the region cannot be
compared with any other region of the world. The inter-relationship of these factors
creates a high risk, though with low probability but disastrous consequences, for a
situation of oil pollution in the area. The mishap prone area due to conflicts, piracy or
terrorism substantially poses a challenge for the development of any risk criteria due
to highly uncertain circumstances as well as consequences. However, despite this
difficulty, it is safe to consider it as a medium risk situation in our context.
Thus, the overall risk profile for an oil pollution incident can be developed by
summarising the discussion in the Table 5.
Table 5 : Development of risk profile.
Risk Classification
Minimal

Minor

Moderate

Major

Catastrophic

Frequent

Low

Low

Medium

High

High

Probable

Low

Low

Medium

High

High

Occasional

Very Low

Low

Medium

High

High

Remote

Very Low

Very
Low

Low

Medium

High

Improbable

Very Low

Very
Low

Low

Medium

High

Incredible

Very Low

Very
Low

Very Low

Low

Medium

Probability

Severity
of
Consequences

Source: Clinical Risk Assessment Criteria, Retrieved from World Wide Web, 17
August 2009, events.london.nhs.uk/events/uploads/appendix_c.doc
The data can be evaluated against the concept of ALARP (as low as reasonably
practicable) matrix which determines the level of risk acceptable to the society. The
concept provides for the need for undertaking measures for reducing the risk to as low
as reasonably practicable by taking risk reduction or control measures.
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Figure 16 : ALARP Matrix.
Source: http://www.aribaproject.org, 2009
Thus, Table 6 and Figure 16 show that the risk of oil pollution incidents falls in the
ALARP or tolerable region. This necessitates the requirement for the countries in the
region to implement measures for reduction of this risk. These measures include the
provisioning of oil spill response capabilities in addition to implementing adequate
preventive measures to reduce the risk of oil pollution. Thus, an efficient oil spill
response mechanism acts as a suitable risk control and reduction system enabling
reduction of overall risk of oil pollution in area.
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CHAPTER 4
EXISTING MECHANISMS – OIL SPILL RESPONSE
IN NORTHERN INDIAN OCEAN
4.1

Introduction

The Northern Indian Ocean has been found to have a medium risk for an oil spill
incident with a few distinct zones of relatively higher risk as discussed in Chapter 3.
There are a number of measures that have been undertaken by the surrounding
countries in the region to minimise this risk. These include certain preventive
measures to influence the probability of occurrence of an oil spill and active measures
for response in combating it to limit its consequences. The present chapter addresses
the issue of the existing mechanisms for response. However, certain preventive
measures that have a direct bearing on the response arrangements have also been
included in the discussion. These include legislative framework, and liability &
compensation regime.
As discussed earlier, there is a lack of data, information and literature concerning the
Northern Indian Ocean especially regarding oil pollution. Hence, the author attempted
to address the issue of insufficient data by directly approaching various sources of
information. These included maritime administrations, oil spill response agencies, and
national environmental agencies, regional organisations working in the field of oil
pollution, academic institutions and ocean research institutes. Although the author
was moderately successful in his endeavour, some of the information was shared in
private capacity and not available in public domain. Thus, it will be used without a
citation or reference for ethical reasons.
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The area of study encompasses a number of countries which have distinct
requirements of oil spill response depending upon the risk, availability of resources
and capabilities. Thus, it is necessary to divide the area into certain subgroups to
discuss the effectiveness of response arrangements. There are two approaches that can
be considered. Firstly, the countries can be grouped into three categories – large oil
producers, large oil consumers and others. The main oil producers located in the
Middle East have a different requirement for response arrangements influenced by a
greater risk than a major consumer like India. However, this approach does not
provide sufficient flexibility for a critical discussion on all aspects influencing the
capabilities of response. Further, it does not address the domain for regional or
bilateral cooperation which are essentially organised on the basis of geographical
locations. Thus, it is preferable to turn to our second approach in dividing them into
groups selected on geographical basis - South Asia, Middle East and North East
Africa. This will certainly be more appropriate for discussion on local parameters
influencing the area. The list of major oil spills from tankers, experienced in the
region is placed in Appendix ‘B’ for reference.
The author has identified that in order to successfully respond to any type of
emergency, including an oil spill incident, there are four essential requirements:
(a)

Well defined organisational structure with clear designation of
responsibilities for launching response.

(b)

Comprehensive plan addressing all contingencies.

(c)

Availability of adequate equipment and other resources.

(d)

Technical expertise in terms of adequately trained personnel.

Hence, the response capability of various countries has been examined under these
broad parameters with certain other relevant issues included in some cases which
affect the overall response capability. These include the legislative framework to
support response infrastructure and financial issues especially the recovery of costs in
case of liability by a third party.
The discussion initially focuses on the capabilities of national arrangements of the
individual countries and later includes the support provided by the industry or private
organisations and the regional cooperative arrangements. Finally, the arrangements
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existing in two other oceanic areas- North Sea and Baltic Sea have also been
summarised to compare and contrast the capabilities existing in these regions with
those in the Northern Indian Ocean.

4.2

Oil Spill Response Measures in South Asia
4.2.1

India

India is the largest country in the region with a coastline of 7500 km. It is a
leading oil importer and also has some offshore oil development and
production facilities located around the coast. The country has been in the
forefront in initiating necessary measures to prevent and control marine oil
pollution. The responsibility for implementing these measures and
coordination of response activities in case of an oil spill was entrusted to the
maritime administration i.e. the Directorate General of Shipping. The agency
was tasked basically to implement MARPOL provisions and had minimal
response capability. Thus, the coordination of response arrangements was
transferred to the Indian Coast Guard in 1986 for efficient response. It
provided an impetus in improving these arrangements. Although there was no
international obligation for developing a National Oil Spill Contingency Plan,
such plan was drafted in 1988 which identified the requirement of cooperation
among various agencies and delineating of their responsibilities with
nomination of a lead agency for overall coordination. The plan was approved
in 1993 by the government and Indian Coast Guard was nominated as the
Central Coordinating Authority for marine oil spill response (ICG, 2006).Thus,
India was fortunate to have a system already in place to meet the requirements
of the OPRC developed later by IMO and ratified by India.
Presently, India has a well developed national plan for oil spill contingencies
integrated with the local and regional plans developed for specific ports,
industrial facilities and other areas, which are regularly updated. The response
is organised in a tiered response arrangement. The local ports, oil facilities and
industrial organisations have the responsibility of setting up the capability to
respond to a Tier-I oil spill in their area of up to 700 tonnes under the
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supervision of the coast guard. The coast guard has developed a capacity to
respond to a Tier-II oil spill of up to 10000 tonnes with three suitably
equipped independent pollution response teams located in Mumbai, Chennai
and Port Blair respectively to cater for any such incidents around the west
coast, east coast and Andaman & Nicobar Islands respectively. It has a
dedicated fleet of ships, helicopters and aircraft to support such operations and
incidentally is shortly inducting three large specialised pollution response
vessels in its inventory. It has developed arrangements to solicit cooperation
and assistance for tackling a Tier-III oil spill in Indian waters and is also
planning to augment its own capabilities. A large stockpile of equipment is
also maintained by private organisations in the country (ICG, 2006).
The country also has a high technical expertise in this field and has a well
developed capacity for undertaking training of personnel. It is well supported
by periodical exercises at local, regional, national and international level.
India is also a party to the CLC 92 and FUND 92 and has successfully claimed
compensation in a few cases. It has encouraged the resource agencies in
contributing resources to build up capabilities. There has been no major oil
spill experienced by the country recently, the last being the 40000 tonnes
spilled by Maersk Navigator in 1993 off A & N Islands (ITOPF, 2009c). It is
also a party to other relevant IMO instruments such as Intervention
Convention and Salvage Convention.
Thus, the country has a well defined organisational structure, trained
manpower, sufficient combat capabilities for a medium spill, efficient
contingency planning and a supporting legislative framework to launch an
effective response to an oil spill incident.

4.2.2

Pakistan

The other major country in the region, Pakistan, presents an interesting picture
as it brings out typical constraints in developing an efficient oil spill response
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infrastructure in a developing country. The country has been quite proactive in
ratifying the IMO instruments concerning marine oil pollution and even
ratified the OPRC and Intervention Convention much before India. However,
it has been quite slow to take steps to implement these measures in national
domain. The issue of oil spill management was not addressed in the national
policies and legislations developed for environment protection in the country.
Although the issue of marine pollution was sometimes included, it lacked
specific focus on oil spill response mechanisms (Mian & Bennett, 2009).
Further, there was no central agency designated to coordinate the response to
such an incident. A host of agencies empowered under different environmental
acts on marine pollution were authorised to take action in this field. For
example, the Pakistan Environment Protection Act, 1997 designates Pakistan
Environment Protection Agency, Pakistan Merchant Shipping Ordinance,
2001 empowers DG Ports and Shipping while Maritime Security Agency Act,
1994 authorises DG Maritime Security Agency to take measures in respect of
marine pollution which seems to include marine oil pollution (Mian & Bennett,
2009).
However, the lacuna in the oil spill response capabilities was exposed during
the worst environmental disaster in Pakistan’s history when an oil tanker,
Tasman Spirit, grounded off Karachi harbour in Jul 2003 spilling more than
30000 tonnes of crude oil at sea. A large area was affected by the spill which
resulted in severe and long term ecological as well as economic impacts. The
national oil spill contingency plan was at the draft stage during this period and
yet to be approved by the government. Thus, there was an initial confusion
regarding organising response with complications arising due to various
individual local, national organisations claiming jurisdictions in coordinating
the response. It resulted in delay for launching response. The operations were
also hampered due to lack of technical expertise and limited equipment and
resources. The clean up operations involved huge costs. However, it was
found that these costs could not be recovered as the country was not a party to
any of the liability and compensation instruments of IMO concerning oil
pollution.
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This incident led to serious thinking on the issue and thus, the national
environment policy developed in 2005 specifically included oil spill
management for the first time in national policy and also stressed the need to
develop a national oil spill contingency plan. It also called for initiating active
legislative and operational measures to implement relevant international
instruments and set up response capabilities. Thus, the issue was fast tracked
and Pakistan ratified the CLC 92 in 2005 and the National Marine Disaster
Contingency Plan was formulated and approved by the government in 2007. It
consisted of three parts and also included the oil spill contingency plan with
responsibility of coordination clearly designated to Maritime Security Agency
(MSA) (SDMC, 2008).
Thus, the incident positively contributed in catapulting the issue of marine oil
pollution into national prominence by highlighting the lacuna in the system for
response and assisting in addressing these lacunae through policy initiatives.
This has significantly improved the response capabilities. Presently, there are
limited resources and equipment available with the MSA and the port
authorities. The training efforts for personnel of various organisations
involved in response have also commenced to build up expertise. Although no
details about capabilities of response are available, it is understood that the
ports have been directed to maintain Tier-I capability with the support of oil
handling companies operating therein while MSA caters for the Tier-II
response. A few exercises have also been conducted at national level to
validate the contingency plan and fine-tune the response organisation structure.
Despite recent proactive approach, the country is yet to ratify the FUND
convention.

4.2.3

Sri Lanka

The country lies close to an important shipping lane at the point of
convergence of maritime traffic routes. Due to this strategic location, the issue
of marine pollution was accorded due importance in national policy and Sri
Lanka was quite active in ratifying relevant IMO instruments including
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MARPOL, CLC, FUND and Intervention Convention. Further, not only it was
prompt in implementing these regulations in a separate Marine Pollution
Prevention Act in 1981, but also created a specialised agency, Marine
Pollution Prevention Authority (MPPA) to undertake steps in ensuring
operational implementation of these measures (MPP Act, Sri Lanka). However,
specific measures towards creation of any infrastructure to respond to an oil
spill incident were not undertaken. Incidentally Sri Lanka is yet to ratify the
OPRC. However, the first national oil spill contingency plan was prepared by
MPPA in 1995 ,revised in 1998 & 1999 and finally approved by the
government in 2000 (MPPA,2009).
However, a need was felt to revise the plan again due to changes in national
regulations on disaster management which included a major oil spill as a
national disaster and also to adapt the current plan to the requirements of a
regional plan under development for South Asian Seas Programme under the
UN Environment Programme (UNEP). The revision was undertaken in a
project of Institutional Strengthening of Oil Contingency Management
(INSTCOM) funded by the Norwegian government which was completed in
2003 (SDMC, 2008). A new Marine pollution prevention act was promulgated
in Jan 2009 to strengthen the MPPA which was renamed as Marine
Environment Protection Authority (MEPA) (MPPA, 2009).
The response mechanism presently in place is developed on the tiered concept
with three levels of response. However, the demarcation of these
classifications have been done as – up to 50 tonnes for Tier –I , 50 to 100
tonnes for Tier-II and more than 100 tonnes for Tier-III. The local agencies e.g.
ports, oil terminals are mandated to have an approved contingency plan along
with appropriate response equipment and resources to launch Tier-I response.
They have to take command of such operations and keep the MEPA informed
about the developments and request assistance in case it develops into Tier-II
or III.
Tier-II spills are handled by MEPA with support from local facilities for Tier-I.
However, large spills requiring Tier-III response will be dealt with mainly by
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requesting international assistance in augmenting national resources. The
organisational structure is clearly defined with MEPA being the lead agency
for coordinating response up to Tier –II independently. As the Tier-III spills
are most likely to be treated as a national disaster, the response coordination
will be taken over by the Disaster Management Committee (DMC). However,
the MEPA is most likely to work as operational coordinator under the DMC
due to its expertise in this field. Thus the command and control of response
operations is well defined and documented in the plan to avoid any confusion.
The national plan addresses contingencies of a small oil spill and therefore
there is limited response equipment available in the country. Most of the
equipment is located with the Sri Lankan Ports Authority and the Ceylon
Petroleum Corporation, which is more suited to be used in sheltered waters in
and around the port area. Thus, an oil spill incident far away from the coast
still needs to be tackled utilising minimal resources. Further, the MEPA does
not have any vessels and aircraft available to launch response operations and
has to depend upon a host of resource agencies for these resources which are
not specifically suited for these operations. The response is cooperated by the
MEPA through the three regional centres established at Hamanthota, Galle
and Kaluthara other than the national centre at Colombo.
There are no major oil spills experienced in Sri Lankan waters. However,
regular training of personnel is undertaken in-house by MEPA and also by
utilising expertise available at regional level. The contingency plan is also
validated by periodic exercises.
It is among the few countries in the region which has implemented the CLC
and FUND conventions in their national legislations. Thus, there exists a
mechanism to recover the liability costs towards oil spill clean up and
restoration expenses.
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4.2.4

Maldives

Maldives is an archipelago consisting of a chain of small low lying islands.
Due to its special vulnerability, it has a need of placing a high priority on
environmental sustainability and environmental protection to be incorporated
as an essential element in the national development planning process.
However, the specific factors uniquely influencing this island nation focussed
the attention on issues such as climate change, global warming and sea level
rise in the context of environment protection and to a certain extent pollution
generated due to human developmental activities. The absence of any major
port also resulted in the issue of marine oil pollution being forced out of the
national policy. Thus, the National Environment Action Plans (NEAP), the
first of which was formulated in 1989 and the second in 1999 also did not
address this issue despite the overall objective of the plans being – to protect
and preserve the environment of Maldives (Maldives Embassy, US, 2009).
However, with the Environment Protection and Preservation Act, 1993, it also
addressed the area of intentional discharges by ships for the first time with
provisions of fine against defaulters.
Maldives was, however, an active member in IMO and was among the first
few countries in the region which has ratified the important instruments
related to oil pollution except the OPRC and Intervention convention, which it
has not ratified yet.
The country currently does not have a national oil spill contingency plan and
has included the development of such plan in the third NEAP (2009 to 2013)
to be completed by mid-2010 (NEAP 3 Maldives,2009). It also does not have
any capability for oil spill response and relies on the capabilities available at
the regional level in the area in neighbouring countries. The only port in the
country visited by ocean going vessels also does not have any such capability.
Although it has not witnessed any major oil spill, it seems to be the most
vulnerable country in the region against such incident.
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4.3

Regional Cooperation in South Asia for Oil Spill Response

The cooperation among the various countries in South Asia was provided a formal
platform by the UNEP Regional Seas Programme which encouraged the development
of regional agreements for combating marine pollution in cases of emergency even
prior to the OPRC coming into force in 1995. Thus, the Action Plan for the South
Asia Regional Seas Programme was adopted in 1995 which addressed the issues
concerning environmental management with specific emphasis on development and
implementation of national oil spill contingency planning (SASP, 2009). Although the
regional oil and chemical marine pollution contingency plan was drafted and
approved by the high level meeting held in Colombo in 2000, it is yet to be
implemented as it has not been activated by finalisation of necessary MoUs of
cooperation. Thus, there is no formal cooperation arrangement in the region on oil
spill response.
However, there have been some instances of assistance provided at the regional level
by countries in the region. In 2006, India responded to the request of Sri Lanka for
assistance to combat an oil spill off Galle harbour due to the sinking of MV Amanat
Shah and provided a pollution response task force comprising two large vessels with
integrated helicopters and aircraft along with pollution response equipment and
personnel (ICG, 2009). During the Tasman Spirit oil spill in Pakistan, India offered
assistance in terms of equipment and personnel for oil spill response. However, the
offer was not utilised by Pakistan. India also regularly undertakes training of
personnel in combating oil spills for Maldives and Sri Lanka and conducts periodic
exercises with them. Thus, the informal set up exists for cooperation among the
countries towards launching joint operations to combat any major oil spill in area.
However, it is purely voluntary and case specific in the absence of any institutional
mechanism.

4.4

Industry / Private Capabilities for oil spill response

In India, most of the major ports have developed Tier-I response capabilities with
provision of necessary equipment. In addition, around 20 operators of offshore oil
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facilities have also set up Tier –I response infrastructure (ITOPF, 2009c). Some of the
major oil production companies e. g. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation have also made
arrangements to utilize equipment of oil spill response from the industry cooperatives
and other contractors located in East Asia and other location globally. Thus, a
significant quantity of equipment is available with the private organisations in India.
However, in other countries except Sri Lanka, where a nominal capability exists with
Sri Lankan Ports Authority and Ceylon Petroleum Corporation, very limited quantity
of equipment is available with the private entities.
4.5

Strengths and Weakness of Response System in South Asia

The region presents an interesting mix of implementing mechanisms for addressing
environmental concerns related to marine field including the arrangements for
responding to oil spill incidents. The major factor influencing the development of
these mechanisms seems to be the relative importance of oil pollution as a policy
issue in national domain and the availability of adequate resources for building up the
required equipment and resources. The fact that the region did not experience any
major oil spill for many years also significantly contributed to this lack of awareness.
The major incident in respect of Tasman Spirit oil spill in Pakistan definitely has a
positively effect in bringing the issue into prominence and forcing critical
examination of these arrangements by the countries. The analysis of the discussion in
preceding paragraphs suggests the following strengths and weaknesses:

Sr.No

Strengths

Weaknesses

1.

Contingency Planning

Contingency Planning

The major country in the region, National
India

has

developed
supported

a

sufficiently

contingency
by

regularly

contingency

plan

in

well respect of Pakistan has recently

planning been drawn up while that of
updated Srilanka is pending revision. In both

national plan and related local level cases,
plans.

there

is

lack

of

well

developed local plans connected
with the national plan. Maldives
does not have such a plan in place.
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Sr.No

Strengths

Weaknesses

2.

Tiered Response Capability

Tiered Response Capability

India has developed a capability to India is the only country that has the
respond to Tier –II spills up to capability to respond to oil spills of
10000 tonnes while Sri Lanka has more than 100 tonnes.
capability up to 100 tonnes.
3.

Equipment and Resources

Equipment and Resources

India has an adequate stockpile of Very
specialised

combat

limited

equipment

and

equipment resources are available in Pakistan

including vessels and aircraft to and Sri Lanka with no specialised
launch effective response.

vessels or aircraft. No resources are
available with Maldives.

4.

Competent National Authority

Competent National Authority

All countries except Maldives now The

nascent

arrangements

in

have a clearly defined command Pakistan is yet to stabilise while in
structure in place with a designated Sri Lanka, the role of DMC in Tiernational
5.

authority

for

oil

spill III oil spill with declaration of a

response.

national disaster is confusing.

Training and Exercises

Training and Exercises

India has a high level of expertise Maldives has no capability. Pakistan
for training and undertakes regular is in the process of setting up the
exercises at local, national and required
international level.

mechanism

while

Sri

Lanka has limited training expertise
and national exercises.

6.

Regional Cooperation

Regional Cooperation

Good precedence exists for informal No formal agreement exists for
cooperation among the states for cooperation among the states for oil
7

joint operations.

spill response.

OPRC

OPRC

India and Pakistan have ratified.

Sri Lanka and Maldives have not
ratified.

Although

Pakistan

has

ratified, it is in the process of
implementing it
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Sr.No

Strengths

Weaknesses

8.

Other Issues

Other Issues

India and Sri Lanka have ratified Pakistan and Maldives are yet to
relevant

IMO

incorporated

instruments
in

and ratify FUND convention. Pakistan is

legislative developing

framework.

the

legislative

framework for implementation of
ratified conventions. Maldives does
not have any such framework
currently.

4.6

Oil Spill Response Measures in the Middle East

The Middle East region is the most important area in the Indian Ocean region in
respect of risk of oil pollution as a major portion of seaborne oil trade is originated
from this area. The response arrangements towards an oil spill incident in various
countries in the area are summarised as follows:
4.6.1

Iran

Iran is one of the major oil producers in the region and is also among the few
countries which have been in the forefront in addressing the oil pollution
issues. It is a party to all the relevant IMO instruments including OPRC and
has actively pursued measures to implement them in the national legislation.
However, despite being a net exporter of oil, it has only recently ratified
FUND, 92 which is yet to come into force for the country. The practical
implementation of the oil spill response measures took a relatively longer time.
Although there were arrangements set up in the ports with the help from oil
handling companies to combat any oil spill, there was no consolidated plan
either at regional or at national level with the responsibility divided between
various agencies. However, during 2002, a national plan for oil pollution
preparedness, response and cooperation was framed and approved by the
government which was developed with the support of the IMO. Thus, the
Ports and Shipping Organisation (PSO) was designated as the national
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authority responsible for coordinating response in Iranian Waters (PMO,
2009).
The response is organised through a National Coordination Centre set up
under PSO. A network of provincial coordination centres in each province has
also been set up for efficient implementation of the plan. In addition, all the
governmental and non governmental bodies using the sea and the coastal areas
are also required to establish local centres for oil pollution response under
information to the national authority. While the national centre is run by the
PSO, the provincial centres are managed by the relevant provincial authority
which is generally the Directorate General of Ports and Shipping in that
province. The local centres are managed by the agencies themselves under
supervision of provincial authorities. Each authority is mandated to have a
separate contingency plan for its area of responsibility, which is fully
integrated with the plan at next higher level (PMO, 2009).
The response is modelled on Tiered concept. The spills up to 50 tonnes are
classified as Tier-I and all the local centres have the capability of responding
to such incident with their own equipment and resources. The spills of Tier-II
between 50 and 500 tonnes are the responsibility of the provincial centres.
However, the resources and equipment may be required to be mobilised from
other provincial centres or national centre, in which case national structure is
activated. In case of Tier-III spills of more than 500 tonnes, the responsibility
of coordination of response lies with the national authority. Some of the local
centres which are subject to higher risk of oil spills due to large volumes of oil
loading / discharge operations, have been equipped with the capability to deal
with a much larger spill than that mandated in the national plan on the
direction of national authority.
Thus, there is a well structured organisation for activation of oil pollution
response. There are significant amount of resources and equipment available
with PSO as well as the National Iranian Tanker Company. The country also
has good experience of dealing with large oil spills due to its long drawn out
conflict with Iraq and the worst oil spill ever during the first gulf war in 1991
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(ITOPF, 2009c).In addition, a well developed technical expertise is build up
by regular training of personnel undertaken both in-house as well as with the
support from the regional organisation existing in the region and the IMO. It
also has an institutionalised system for conducting exercises at national and
regional level to fine-tune the system. Thus, over the period of time, an
efficient response system has been developed in the country for oil spill
response. The only lacuna in the overall picture, the non ratification of FUND,
92, has also been rectified and thus is likely to contribute in complementing
the existing efforts towards setting up better infrastructure.

4.6.2

Oman

The concern regarding protection and preservation of environment has
historically been part of the national policy in the country since 1984 when
Oman became the first Arab country to set up a ministry exclusively
concerned with the environment to give thrust to the implementation of the
first ever environmental legislation enacted by the Sultanate in 1974 & 1979
( Oman Embassy, 2009). In line with these policies, the first national oil spill
contingency plan was promulgated in 1985 which was followed by an update
in 1992 called the Action Plan for combating marine oil spills. Both of these
plans were superseded by the Oman national oil spill contingency plan of 1995
(IMO, 2002). The plan has recently been revised again in 2004 with the
support from IMO and ITOPF to address the international developments on
the issues.
The overall responsibility for coordination of response to an oil spill incident
is entrusted to the erstwhile Ministry of Regional Municipalities, Environment
and Water Resources which is now shifted to the newly formed Ministry of
Environment and Climate Affairs (MECA). The response is organised in a
tiered concept which strangely includes Tier 0. An oil spill with potential
impact requiring no action under the plan and managed by the polluter is
classified as Tier 0. Spills of less than 100 tonnes classified as Tier –I are
required to be dealt with using local resources while Tier –II spills between
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100 and 500 tonnes would require assistance from the resources under the plan.
Tier-III spills of more than 500 tonnes would most likely include seeking of
international resources (Al-Busaidy, 2008). The organisational structure is
slightly confusing as there is no distinct agency or centre designated as the
coordinator at national level other than the concerned ministry. Tier-I incident
is looked after by the pollution control operations centre (PCOC) of the
ministry while for Tier-II incident, a higher coordinating committee (HCC)
consisting of ministerial members belonging to various ministries is convened.
Any action by the PCOC needs to be approved by the HCC. Tier –III incident
is considered as a national disaster and thus it is responsibility of National
Committee for Civil Defence (NCCD) which also consists of the HCC
members (ITOPF, 2009c).The operational control of the response effort lies
with the PCOC. In addition, the Petroleum Development Oman, the main
exploration and production company in the country also is responsible for
maintaining adequate response capability along with suitable contingency
planning in its oil facilities.
Oman has a considerable quantity of response equipment which is maintained
by various agencies involved in response operations. Although it has not
experienced any major oil spill in its region , it has build up technical expertise
to handle response operations by regular training .Periodic exercises are also
conducted to test the country’s emergency response with participation from
national and regional resource agencies, the latest in the series conducted in
Dec 2008 (Oman MEA, 2008 ).
Incidentally, it is the only country in the region which is a party to all relevant
IMO instruments, although it ratified the OPRC recently in Jun 2008. Thus, it
also has the requisite legal framework to support response capability.
4.6.3

United Arab Emirates

The country is a federation of seven emirates and hence the response
infrastructure developed in the UAE reflects this political organisation. It was
quite slow in addressing the concerns about oil pollution despite being a major
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producer and handler of oil. Incidentally, it was not a party to the primary oil
spill control instrument , the MARPOL convention for a long time and ratified
it only recently in 2007. It is yet to ratify OPRC. However, till 1998, the
national oil company, Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) was
mandated to organise the response around its facilities and a well equipped
response centre was maintained by ADNOC at Ruwais. There were gaps in the
strategies for launching response at national and regional level due to absence
of any other infrastructure and organisation and no contingency planning
existed against the risks in area. Further, the issue was left to the individual
emirates with no national focus.

Thus, a federal law on protection and

development of the environment was promulgated in 1999 which also
addressed the issue of marine oil pollution. The national contingency plan for
the control of marine environment pollution was drafted and approved in 2002
(ITOPF, 2009c). The Federal Environmental Agency (FEA) is responsible for
coordinating response to the oil spills through six operational oil spill centres
established around the country. The local facilities dealing with oil have also
been mandated to have their own contingency plans (McKenzie, 2003).
The response is organised on a tiered structure where Tier-I spills of smaller
size affecting local area are required to be tackled by the local facility e.g.
ports, oil companies. Tier-II spills of up to 2000 tonnes are the responsibility
of individual emirates. However, the response will be organised through a
committee with members drawn from various stakeholders including FEA,
local government, ports, oil companies etc. FEA is responsible for Tier-III
spills affecting more than one emirate and require support of international
agencies for coordinating response.
Sufficient quantity of equipment is generally maintained in the country,
though not only under FEA, but also largely with ADNOC and other
stakeholders. Incidentally, two out of the six operations centres are operated
through arrangement with ADNOC (McKenzie, 2003). Adequately trained
manpower is generally available with the operators of the equipment through
in- house training but largely under training arrangements with the leading
industry and regional intergovernmental organisations. The country had
experienced some oil spills during the Iran-Iraq war, but not with major effects.
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However, it has started taking part in periodic exercises conducted under the
regional framework with neighbouring countries. The liability and
compensation system is also in place to support the response arrangements.
4.6.4

Saudi Arabia

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the largest producer and exporter of oil in the
world. It lies in an area of the highest traffic congestion in shipping routes in
the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea. However, it has been slow to address the
environmental concerns related to oil pollution. Incidentally, it was not a party
to any major IMO instruments related to marine pollution till recently and has
ratified the MARPOL and CLC, 92 in 2005. It is yet to become party to other
important related IMO instruments e.g. OPRC, Intervention. Further, despite
being a net exporter of oil, it is not a party to FUND convention which
restricts its capability towards claiming liability and compensation in case of
an oil spill.
Although the first national oil spill contingency plan was approved in 1991, it
basically depended on the agencies with marine and coastal facilities or
activities to develop their own local oil spill contingency plans and provide
adequate equipment and manpower to organise response (Saber, 1998). Thus,
the leading oil company, the Saudi Aramco, established a well structured
response infrastructure with contingency planning, necessary equipment and
manpower arrangements. The national plan has been revised and now
designates the Presidency of Meteorology and Environment (PME) as the
overall coordinator of response arrangements. The response is organised
through Area Operations Committee and Environment Protection Committee
with membership of various other government organisations and departments
(ITOPF, 2009c).
Although it is understood that the response is coordinated on the tiered
concept, the details about the capability are not available. However, it has the
largest pollution response capability in the region mainly due to private efforts.
A significant quantity of equipment is held with PME and various port
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authorities. In addition, Saudi Aramco maintains a large stockpile of
equipment. A highly skilled trained manpower is also available mostly due to
private efforts. Regular large scale exercises are also arranged at national as
well as international level. The country has gained extensive experience in
spill response techniques while handling spills during first gulf war. PME and
Saudi Aramco coordinated a major response effort during which more than
one million barrels of oil were recovered (ITOPF, 2009c). Thus, despite the
lacuna in not being a party to OPRC and delay in acceding to other marine
pollution conventions, it has set up an efficient response mechanism.

4.6.5

Yemen

The country is the lowest producer of oil in the Middle East. However, the
Gulf of Aden experiences significant oil traffic close to the country. Although
the details regarding environmental awareness and initiatives by the national
government are very limited, the country has not been a party to any IMO
instruments concerning marine pollution other than Intervention Convention
for a long time and has not even ratified the MARPOL. However, it has
recently ratified the CLC, 92 in 2006.
The maritime affairs authority has been designated as the agency responsible
for marine environment and pollution issues. However, there is no formal
national oil spill contingency plan and there is no statutory requirement for
ports or oil handling facilities to have such plans in place. Incidentally, a few
companies have developed their plans on voluntary basis. Thus, in the event of
an oil spill, no coordinated response is possible and the individual companies
will be left to deal with such situation. The availability of response equipment
is extremely limited in the country with only a few sets available with
government and public agencies. There are also lack of training resources and
constraints of qualified manpower for undertaking efficient operations (ITOPF,
2009c). Currently, IMO is acting as a facilitator towards development of a
national oil spill contingency plan and strengthening of the response
infrastructure in the country (OSTC, 2009)
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4.6.6

Qatar

The country is located in the area enclosed by the Arabian Gulf and lies in a
high risk zone for oil pollution. However, it has not proactively addressed the
issue and like most of the other countries in the region, it was not a party to
major IMO instruments on marine pollution for a long period. With the
encouragement from IMO and the regional organisation operating in area, it
has ratified MARPOL, OPRC CLC 92 and FUND 92 and is now among the
few countries to do so. The information about the origins of the response
mechanism to an oil spill incident has been quite limited. However, there has
been contingency planning undertaken by the local oil companies and port
authorities with provision of supporting response infrastructure and equipment.
Currently, the national contingency plan has been revised in 2005 and is yet to
be approved by the government (ITOPF, 2009c).
It draws a set up for organising response which is slightly different from the
conventional one. Although the overall responsibility is designated to the
Environment Protection Committee (EPC) consisting of members from
various concerned government and private agencies, most of the infrastructure
depends on the Qatar Petroleum (QP) resources. It maintains all the response
equipment and resources and also mans the operations centre for reporting of
oil spill incidents. Incidentally, the provisions also require QP to provide
adequate resources to respond to all incidents within the country’s waters
including its own facilities. The equipment earlier maintained by the port
authorities have also been transferred to QP (ITOPF, 2009c).
The response for a small spill within a local area is coordinated by the local
authority with assistance from QP while for larger spills, EPC will convene
and nominate on scene commander. QP will however, deal with the response
arrangements (ITOPF, 2009c). QP maintains a considerable stock of
equipment with arrangements for necessary vessels and helicopter resources.
The training requirements are met generally using international and regional
resources and participation in regional exercises is also undertaken regularly to
improve capability of response organisation.

68

4.6.7

Bahrain

It is an archipelagic country formed of 36 low lying islands located in the
Arabian Gulf. The national contingency plan for an oil spill has been
developed but very limited details are available about the implementation of
response mechanisms. The department of Environment Affairs (DEA) is the
agency responsible for coordinating response operations which is organised on
tiered concept with three levels of response. The small spills of Tier-I is
tackled by the facilities of Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) and port
authorities with their resources and equipment. However, Tier-II and III is
coordinated by Director General, DEA through establishment of Incident
Command Centre. The larger spills are tackled through assistance from
international resources. A few of the local facilities have their own
contingency plans in place (ITOPF, 2009c).
DEA has a substantial stockpile of response equipment but there is no
organised structure for maintenance and training and periodic exercises. For
the larger spills, resources from private sources will also be tasked to augment
those from the government. The vessels and aircraft are utilised from a host of
government agencies including defence forces and coast guard. BAPCO also
maintains a major stockpile of such equipment. Thus, overall, sufficient
equipment is available to deal with a medium sized spill in the country.
The country has ratified MARPOL recently in 2007 and is not a party to
OPRC. However, it is a party to CLC and FUND conventions, thus,
successfully addressing the liability and compensation issues.

4.6.8

Kuwait

The country lies at the head of the Arabian Gulf and has suffered the worst oil
pollution incidents ever in the world during the first gulf war in 1991. As with
the other countries of the region, it was also not a party to the major marine
pollution conventions of IMO for a considerable period of time and ratified
MARPOL in 2007 and CLC in 2004. It is yet to ratify OPRC and FUND
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conventions. The availability of details about response infrastructure is quite
limited despite the presence of the headquarters of the Regional Organization
for the Protection of the Marine Environment (ROPME) located in the country.
Although there is a national contingency plan in place nominating
Environment Protection Authority (EPA) to be responsible for coordinating
response, it is organised through a national committee dealing specifically
with oil issues with members drawn from various government and private
agencies. A minor spill is dealt with by the local agencies in the area e.g.
Kuwait Oil Company (KOC), local ports, while the major spills is coordinated
by the committee using resources from different regions. Further, KOC and
ports have their own contingency plans to deal with any such incident (ITOPF,
2009c).
The country has a substantial stock of response equipment maintained by the
users or operators, who also hold the resources owned by EPA. The
requirement of vessels and aircraft is met by relevant agencies including KOC,
ports, defence forces and coast guard. All these authorities have adequately
trained manpower utilising the resources of the regional organisation and
participate regularly in the exercises conducted at the national and
international level.
The country has experienced a large number of oil spills, not necessarily from
tanker operations or casualties and gained considerable expertise and
experience in handling response to such situation.

4.6.9

Iraq

No information is available on current infrastructure and capability as state of
the existing response mechanism after the gulf wars is not widely available.
4.6.10 Jordan
The country is located at the head of Red Sea and has a very small coastline
with only one major port at Aqaba. It has been slow in developing
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arrangements for oil spill response and was not a party to many IMO
instruments on the subject. It has recently ratified MARPOL and OPRC and is
a party to CLC, 69 and not CLC 92, FUND and Intervention conventions. The
national contingency plan has been developed but yet to be approved by the
government. The responsibility for coordinating the response to such an
incident is given to the Ports Corporation located at Aqaba. The corporation
has adequate resources and equipment to combat a spill up to 200 tonnes in
area. Larger spills are responded jointly with the neighbouring countries,
Egypt and Israel with whom the country has a bilateral arrangement for such
cooperation (ITOPF, 2009c).

4.7

Industry / Private Capabilities for Oil Spill Response
4.7.1

National Oil Companies

Most of the major oil companies operating in the region maintain a large
stockpile of equipment and resources on their own which is essentially much
bigger than the capability maintained by the government sources. Saudi
Aramco has the world’s largest stockpile of oil spill response equipment
among the oil companies in the world which includes specialised vessels,
aircraft, helicopters and trained personnel (ITOPF, 2009c). ADNOC is
responsible for stocking and maintaining two out of six national oil spill
centres in the UAE (McKenzie, 2003). QP also provides almost all of the TierII response equipment available in Qatar and undertakes the operational
response to any oil spill incident in the country. Petroleum Development
Oman, National Iranian tanker Company and Bahrain Petroleum Company
also have considerable capability in their respective areas of operations which
supplements the national setup.
4.7.2

Industry Cooperatives

The oil companies operating in area also tend to rely on the services of third
party private organisations for Tier- II & III response than their respective
national governmental capabilities. These organisations are generally the oil
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industry cooperatives (Moller, 1997). Two important organisations operating
in the region are as follows:
(a) Regional Clean Sea Organisation (RECSO)

It is an oil industry

cooperative organisation formed by 13 major oil companies in the
region with an objective of launching oil spill response through mutual
aid by pooling of resources. It has become an important player not only
in sharing of equipment and resources among the members but also in
addressing the larger issue of capacity building in the field through
training of personnel, conduct of joint exercises and providing
technical support ( RECSO, 2009).
(b)

Oil Spill Response Limited (OSRL)

All the major oil

companies are members of this UK based organisation which provides
full response services including trained manpower, (response team and
technical advisors), equipment and other resources. It maintains three
Tier-III pollution response centres at Southampton, Singapore and
Bahrain respectively. In addition to the resources positioned at Bahrain,
the equipment from other centres can also be provided within 24 hours,
if needed. It also undertakes training and capacity building through
exercises (OSRL, 2009).

4.7.3

Other Trade Associations

The Petroleum Association of Japan (PAJ), a non profit trade association, also
has a number of stockpiles of oil spill response equipment strategically located
along the tanker routes from the Middle East to Japan. The equipment can be
borrowed free of cost whenever needed and returned after cleaning and
repairing / replacing the damaged items. It has six domestic and five overseas
bases, two of which are located in the Middle East at Saudi Arabia and Abu
Dhabi respectively (PAJ, 2008).
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4.8

Regional Cooperation in Middle East for Oil Spill Response

Although the individual countries in the region were quite slow in developing national
environmental legislation and ratifying the related IMO instruments, the necessity of
mutual cooperation to combat oil spills was recognised by them. With the
encouragement from the UNEP, the following two regional frameworks have been
worked out:
4.8.1

PERSGA

It is the Regional Organization for the Conservation of the Environment of the
Red Sea and Gulf of Aden (PERSGA), which is an intergovernmental
organisation dedicated to the conservation of the coastal and marine
environment. It was established consequent to the adoption of the Jeddah
Convention, formally titled "Regional Convention for the Conservation of the
Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Environment" in 1982. Although the convention
came into force in 1985, the PERSGA was created in 1995 and now provides a
platform for intergovernmental cooperation on environmental issues. A
revised PERSGA /IMO action plan for the development of national systems
and regional mechanisms for preparedness and response to major marine oil
spills in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden was formulated in Jun 2005 which
supports development of national plans and systems in the countries that do
not have these and to establish a regional mechanism for achieving
coordinated response to any major oil spills. Its members include Saudi Arabia,
Jordon and Yemen in Middle East and Djibouti, Egypt, Somalia and Sudan in
Africa. It is not a provider of response equipment and undertakes capacity
building through technical support and training for implementation of
necessary measures (PERSGA, 2009).
4.8.2

ROPME and MEMAC

The Marine Emergency Mutual Aid Centre (MEMAC) is based in Bahrain and
was formed through the Kuwait Action Plan, under the Regional Convention
for Cooperation on the Protection of Marine Environment from Pollution,
1978 which provided the background for development of the Regional
Organisation for the Protection of Marine Environment (ROPME). Thus,
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MEMAC is the operational centre of ROPME which provides a platform for
cooperation among members to launch joint efforts against oil spills. It also
supports revision or development of national contingency planning, relevant
implementing legislations and technical support through training and exercises.
The members include Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia
and UAE (MEMAC, 2009).
4.9

Strengths and Weakness of Response System in Middle East

The mechanism for delivery of efficient response to an oil spill in this high risk area is
found to be quite different than the conventional system where the governments
undertake major responsibility in setting up the infrastructure and resources. Further,
the countries in the region except a very few, have lagged far behind in ratifying even
basic IMO instruments concerning marine pollution like MARPOL. Despite recent
efforts by the regional organisations and the IMO, there is still some lacuna in this
area. The region has definitely developed an operational model for arranging better
preparedness and response due to experience with some of the largest oil spills. The
overall strengths and weaknesses of the oil spill response mechanism are discussed
below:
Sr.No

Strengths

Weaknesses

1.

Contingency Planning

Contingency Planning

Major countries in the region have a A large number of states do not
sufficiently

well

developed have a valid national contingency

contingency planning supported by plan well supported by national
regularly updated national plan and governmental agency. Yemen does
related local level plans.

not have such a plan in place.
Jordan has a draft plan yet to be
approved.

2.

Tiered Response Capability

Tiered Response Capability

The response is generally organised In many states, the tiered response
clearly in a tiered concept for is not followed properly either due
efficient delivery in all the states to lack of capacity or due to single
except Qatar, Yemen and Jordan.

private

agency

operational response.
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tasked

for

Sr.No

Strengths

Weaknesses

3.

Equipment and Resources

Equipment and Resources

A large stockpile of specialised Very

limited

combat equipment including vessels resources

are

equipment

and

available

with

and aircraft to launch effective governmental agencies in majority
response is maintained in the region of states. Limited equipment and
which is generally available for use resources are available with Yemen.
in different states.
4.

Competent National Authority

Competent National Authority

All countries except Yemen now In most states, the nominated
have a clearly defined command authority does not have real control
structure in place with a designated which is generally exercised by
national

authority

for

oil

spill national oil company.

response.

In few

countries, the command structure
becomes confusing in Tier-III when
there is an overlap with the national
disaster response organisations.

5.

Training and Exercises

Training and Exercises

The region has moderate capability Limited in-house training expertise
in having a structured training exists in most of the states which
programme and undertakes regular generally
exercises

at

national

depends

on

private

and resources or those provided by the

international level.

regional

organisation.

Limited

exercises at national or local level.
6.

Regional Cooperation
Intergovernmental

Regional Cooperation
cooperation Failure to develop any regional

exists at regional level in the form of contingency plans for the region.
two regional organisations in the Cooperation generally limited to
region. Successful in supporting training and technical support and
members

to

improve

response no mechanisms for sharing of

capability by improving ratification resources
of IMO instruments and developing operations.
national contingency plan.
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or

launching

joint

Sr.No

Strengths

Weaknesses

7

OPRC

OPRC

The recent efforts by IMO and Most of the states have not ratified
regional organisations have resulted the OPRC. A few have recently
in a few states ratifying OPRC.

ratified but are yet to implement it
in national legislation.

8.

Other Issues

Other Issues

-The region has one of the largest -Despite being a net exporter of oil,
capabilities set up by the private most of the states have not ratified
entities for oil spill response.

FUND convention which restricts

-The provisioning of Tier- II & III liability and compensation claims.
equipment

through

industry -Many

countries

have

recently

cooperatives ensures quick response ratified MARPOL and there are a
in bypassing bureaucracy of inter- few states that are yet to ratify this
governmental organisations.

basic

convention

on

marine

pollution.

4.10

Oil Spill Response Measures in the North-east Africa

This group covers the countries that are located along the Red Sea and the Gulf of
Aden on the north east part of Africa. The countries south of Somalia are considered
part of the Western Indian Ocean and thus excluded from this study. The countries in
this group have a similar risk profile as those of the Middle East; however, the
approach adopted by them is quite different.
4.10.1 Egypt
The country due to its strategic location in the Red Sea and the Suez Canal had
been in the forefront in addressing the issue of marine oil pollution. it is one of
the few countries in the region which has ratified all the relevant IMO
instruments except FUND convention. The first national oil spill contingency
plan was prepared in 1986 and then was reviewed and updated in 1998 to
conform to the requirements of

OPRC. The Egyptian Environmental Affairs

Agency (EEEA) is designated as the overall coordinator for oil spill response.
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A National Contingency Planning Committee (NCPC) advises and assists
EEEA and in the event of a major spill, an Emergency Response Committee
(ERC) may be convened to advise and assist EEEA (JICA, 2008).
The response is coordinated in a tiered concept. Tier-I spills up to 100 tonnes
are coordinated by the local facilities with their own resources. In Tier-II spills
up to 1000 tonnes, EEEA will take responsibility for response but may
delegate it to another body. Also, Tier-II response originating in petroleum
sector will continue to be directed by the Egyptian General Petroleum
Corporation (EGPC) unless it is specifically requested for assistance. Tier-III
spills of more than 1000 tonnes will be looked after by EEEA and ERC will
also be convened. A considerable stockpile of equipment is maintained in the
country with one EEEA response centre and four centres maintained by EGPC.
In addition, Suez Canal Authority and other ports also possess adequate
equipment for launching response in their area. The EGPC, Suez Canal
Authority and Red Sea Authority have been mandated to have their own
contingency planning for their area (JICA, 2008). The country is capable of
undertaking in-house training of personnel and carries out regular exercises at
national and international level.
4.10.2 Sudan
The country presently does not have any capacity to respond to an oil spill
incident. Although it has designated the Sudanese Maritime Administration
Corporation (SMAC) as the national authority for coordinating response, it has
negligible equipment available in the country(ITOPF,2009c). It also has not
ratified any of the IMO instruments related to marine pollution including
MARPOL and has no legal framework in its national legislation for addressing
marine environmental issues. The regional organisation, PERSGA has
provided support for developing the national system for oil spill response. In
the first stage, a national oil spill contingency plan was formulated and has
now been approved by government in 2004. However, no information is
available whether any supporting infrastructure in terms of organisation,
equipment and legislation has been developed to support the plan.
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4.10.3 Djibouti
The country has relatively been quite responsible in addressing issues
concerning marine pollution and is among the few countries in the region
which has ratified all major IMO instruments on this issue. The Maritime
Affairs Authority (MAA) is designated as the national coordinator for oil
pollution occurring outside port limits. The national plan for oil spill
contingency is quite old and was approved in 1990 and has very limited
information about the response strategies and actions for undertaking an oil
spill response. The responsibility of coordination is divided among two
agencies. Oil spills within the ports are handled by port authorities using their
own resources while those outside are handled by MAA. In addition, local oil
companies have their own contingency plans along with supporting equipment
and manpower for their area of operation. A limited number of resources are
available with the agencies (ITOPF, 2009c). IMO had established a stockpile
of pollution control and clean up equipment at Djibouti in 1980 with the
support of Norway, for use in Gulf of Aden waters of Djibouti, Yemen and
Somalia. However, the operational readiness of this equipment is doubtful.
Hence, a project has been commissioned by PERSGA for assessment of this
stockpile and to suggest actions fro making it operationally available for use
(PERSGA, 2009).
4.10.4 Eritrea
The political developments in the country and frequent conflicts with
neighbouring country have affected the overall development. It has restricted
the national policy in taking due note of the risks of marine oil pollution in the
area. Incidentally, it has not ratified any of the IMO instruments related to
marine pollution including MARPOL. Further, limited information is available
on the response capabilities against an oil spill. A draft national oil and
noxious substances spill contingency plan was formulated in 1995 in which
the department of maritime transport was designated as the coordinating
agency (ITOPF, 2009c). However, no information is available whether any
supporting infrastructure in terms of organisation, equipment and legislation
has been developed to support the plan. A negligible quantity of response
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equipment is held in the country and even sufficient quantity of equipment is
generally not available with the oil companies.
4.10.5 Somalia
No information is available regarding any national organisational structure for
dealing with marine oil pollution.

4.11

Industry / Private Capabilities for Oil Spill Response

Egypt is the only country in the region which has adequate response capability while
other countries have negligible resources. The majority of equipment in Egypt is
maintained by EGPC which has four centres for Tier –II response with necessary
equipment and resources. In addition, Suez Canal Authority has significant stocks
including lightering barges and tugs available for use outside the canal. Port
authorities also have specialised equipment at four main ports to launch quick
response (ITOPF, 2009c).

4.12

Regional Cooperation in North Eastern Africa for Oil Spill Response

All countries except Eritrea are members of the PERSGA, the details of which are
mentioned at Para 4.8.1. However, the development of cooperation is quite slow due
to political factors.

4.13

Strengths and Weakness of Response System in North Eastern Africa

Out of the five countries of the region, only Egypt has a well developed infrastructure
for oil spill response while a minimal structure might also exist in Djibouti. There is
no such capability in Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia. Incidentally, these three countries
do not have any national legal framework supporting marine pollution response and
are not party to any of the IMO instruments on the subject. Thus, overall there is no
capability for response in major part of the region. The lack of any effective
cooperative arrangement at regional level also excludes the possibility of addressing
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this lacuna by seeking assistance of countries lying on the east coast of Red Sea,
mainly Saudi Arabia.

4.14

Oil Spill Response Arrangements in Other Oceanic Areas

The capability of oil spill response in northern Indian Ocean in the three sub groups
discussed in this dissertation can be compared and contrasted with those in other
similar sub regions in the world. The arrangements in two such regions are
summarised below:
4.14.1 North Sea
The agreement for cooperation in dealing with pollution of the North Sea
(Bonn Agreement) is the mechanism by which the North Sea states provide
mutual assistance to each other in combating pollution. Belgium, Denmark,
France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and UK are the members of
this agreement.

Figure 17 : Area covered by Bonn Agreement.
Source: http://www.bonnagreement.org/,2009
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All these countries have a well developed national oil spill response
mechanism. This includes a contingency plan which is comprehensive and
updated regularly with clearly defined organisational structure and
responsibilities, necessary stockpile of equipment and resources, well trained
and exercised personnel and legislative arrangements for supporting current
liability and compensation regime. However, to address the need for creating a
joint response structure for a large spill, a regional cooperation agreement has
been developed which is operational. The area has been divided into eight
zones for the purpose of oil spill monitoring and control and supervisory
responsibilities have been assigned to various states. The operational
arrangements of cooperation have been codified in the Counter Pollution
Manual which is updated regularly. The details of equipment and resources is
maintained and a state can request assistance from other state which is obliged
to comply with the request and fully support the operations of the requesting
state. However, the requesting state will reimburse the cost of these resources
to the assisting state. Detailed arrangements are already worked out regarding
command and control, procedures, financial costs, communication, other
administrative and operational issues. The guidelines for joint surveillance are
also in place. A database of all national capabilities and arrangements is
maintained and updated regularly. Arrangements for joint training and
exercises have been institutionalised and utilised frequently (Bonn Agreement,
2009).
Thus, the efficiency of response in this region is very high compared to the
three subgroups in Northern Indian Ocean due to competent national
arrangements supported by strong regional cooperation among the states.
4.14.2 Baltic Sea
The Baltic Sea is one of the most important sea area threatened by marine
pollution. Thus, the convention for the protection of the marine environment
of the Baltic Sea area was developed in 1974 and revised in 1992. The
governing body of the convention is the Helsinki Commission- Baltic Marine
Environment Protection Commission- also known as HELCOM. The member
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states to HELCOM are Demark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Russia and Sweden.
All these countries have a well developed national oil spill response
mechanism. This includes a contingency plan which is comprehensive and
updated regularly with clearly defined organisational structure and
responsibilities, necessary stockpile of equipment and resources, well trained
and exercised personnel and legislative arrangements for supporting current
liability and compensation regime.

Figure 18 : Area covered by HELCOM.
Source: http://www.helcom.fi/,2009
Regional cooperation is worked out by a group called HELCOM Response.
An arrangement similar to the one mentioned at Para 4.14.1 in Bonn
Agreement also exists in this area (HELCOM, 2009).
Thus, the efficiency of response in this region is also very high compared to
the three subgroups in Northern Indian Ocean due to competent national
arrangements supported by strong regional cooperation among the states.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Conclusion
This dissertation attempted to address the issue of response to a marine oil spill
incident in the Northern Indian Ocean region. At the outset, the background of oil
emerging as a premier source of energy and its need for transportation over the sea
was looked into to understand the origin of the issue. It has been found that oil has
progressively become the major source of energy in all the regions of the world since
its discovery and is likely to continue for a long time. The geographical distribution of
oil rich countries away from the major oil consuming nations has generated the need
for transportation of a large quantity of oil from the producers to consumers. Due to
its cost effectiveness and suitability to provide logistical link between different
continents separated by oceans, shipping has emerged as the primary source of
transportation of this oil. Further, the development of offshore oil exploration and
production facilities has also contributed to the oil coming in close contact with
marine environment. The problem of oil pollution especially in marine environment in
the initial years was met with strategies to prevent the intentional spillages of oil and
oily wastes within harbours and areas located close to the coastline. Further, the
problem was considered more as a nuisance than having any long term environmental
or health hazards.
However, over the period of time, it has been understood that oil pollution has much
larger effect on the marine environment. The overall effect varies greatly depending
on different types of ecosystems. The short term effects include loss of animal and
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plant species, fish and other fisheries resources while there may be serious long term
effects in terms of loss of breeding grounds, impairment of food cycle and loss of
habitat. Apart from these environmental effects, there are large economical costs
concerning contamination of coastal amenities, industries and tourism. It has been
found during the research that shipping or maritime transport is not the major source
of the oil entering into the sea and land based sources account for a much larger share.
However, due to the risk of an extremely large quantity of oil likely to be released in a
small area in case of a marine casualty, the public attention definitely focuses on the
shipping as a major source of such pollution.
The efforts to deal with this problem include setting up of a global mechanism which
addresses not only the intentional discharges but also the accidental pollution.
Incidentally, the thrust towards the development of such mechanism was given by the
oil spill resulting from the Torrey Canyon disaster. Thus, IMO became a forum for
supporting development of international instruments to address this issue. The focus
of this effort was both on preventive as well as response measures. The regulating
framework has been supported by the primary IMO convention on marine pollution,
MARPOL and later augmented by OPRC. However, important parameters of the
mechanism concerning operational practices, design standards of ships and right of
intervention by the coastal state in case of threat of oil pollution, are also relevant and
provided by SOLAS and Intervention Conventions respectively. The major problem
in the implementation of an efficient response framework for an oil spill incident
involves costs of funding the equipment and resources and the clean up operations.
Thus , a suitable three tiered liability and compensation regime has been developed
through CLC and FUND conventions and its relevant protocols to enable recovery of
costs from the polluter on globally recognised ‘Polluter Pays’ principle.
The author considers that although there is a difference between the preventive and
response measures to an oil spill incident, a clear distinction cannot be made between
them as there is certainly an overlap between the two. To develop an effective
response mechanism, the availability of legislative framework to support the response
organisation along with suitable liability and compensation mechanisms is as much
necessary as the provisioning of contingency planning, combat equipment, resources
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and infrastructure. Thus, the study of the efficiency of any response mechanism in
such a case would only be complete by addressing all these aspects.
The next step in the research was to develop a risk profile for an oil pollution incident
in the northern Indian Ocean. The essential ingredients for a risk situation are a
combination of the probability of occurrence of a hazardous situation and the
consequences of that occurrence. This dissertation has identified a number of factors
that contribute towards developing this risk profile.
The main oil producing countries of the world are located in the area and two
important transportation routes for oil tankers pass through the region which carries
about two-thirds of the global seaborne oil trade. Although there are not many marine
casualties experienced, a significant quantity of oil enters into the sea through
operational discharges from ships. A majority of global ship recycling yards are
operating in the Indian subcontinent and hence there is steady flow of ships transiting
the area on their last voyages. Many of these ships are not seaworthy and pose a threat
for collision or grounding especially in severe weather conditions leading to oil
pollution from the ships they collide with. However, no major accidents involving
such ships have been reported.
The region also has ecologically sensitive and fragile ecosystems located in many
countries surrounding the area. These include mangrove areas home to one of the
largest number of species and coastal & backwater lagoons, mudflats and estuaries.
The coral areas are reported to contain one of the largest numbers of species in the
region. Any major oil spill in the area will certainly have a drastic effect on these
ecosystems. The region also experiences seasonal rough weather affecting ocean areas.
The countries in the region generally have limited implementation of pollution
prevention measures thereby increasing the risk of an oil spill. These include less
stringent FSI and PSC inspection and regime, inadequate reception facilities in ports
and lack of strong enforcement mechanism. The lack of resources in these developing
nations has also greatly resulted in degrading the public concern about environmental
issues in general and oil pollution in particular. Thus, the national policies reflect
focus on developmental issues rather than oil pollution.
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A number of geo-political factors have also been identified that impinge on the risk
situation. The political and diplomatic considerations have led to conflicts, war and
hostilities. Incidentally, this was the cause of the largest oil spill ever experienced in
the world during the first gulf war in 1991 when Iraqi soldiers deliberately dumped
thousands of tonnes of oil into the sea. The presence of a failed state, Somalia, poses a
gap in implementation of measures against risk of pollution. It has also led to the
region becoming the hotspot for piracy attacks. Although these attacks have not
resulted in any oil pollution incident, the use of heavy military weapons by the pirates
may sometimes result in damage to the ship leading to pollution. The risk of terrorist
attacks in this area is quite real with two such attacks witnessed on USS Cole and
tanker Limburg in Gulf of Aden.
A critical analysis of these factors was undertaken by the author and it was found that
various factors have different weightage on the probability and consequences part of
the risk matrix with some having low probability but high consequences and vice
versa. Further, the area has certain regions, especially in the Middle East, where the
risk is relatively higher than others. Overall the risk of a major oil spill incident in the
region is estimated to be a medium risk.
To study the oil spill response mechanisms in the Northern Indian Ocean, the author
divided the area into three subgroups namely South Asia, Middle East and Northeastern Africa. It was observed that these subgroups have distinct factors affecting
them in terms of existing risk, economic development, political set up and enclosed or
open ocean areas. This arrangement also helped in studying the regional arrangements
among the countries as these are generally based on geographical locations.
During the research for the dissertation, it was observed that the Northern Indian
Ocean has not been given sufficient attention by the scholars and researchers
compared to other oceanic areas of the world. Incidentally, the information and data
availability regarding marine oil pollution was not only larger in traditional developed
regions in Europe and North America but also in East Asia and Western Indian Ocean
islands. Further, most of the information available related to the technical aspects of
oil pollution rather than administrative or operational set up in the countries or the
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region. Hence, the author attempted to cover these gaps by soliciting information
directly from the national maritime administrations, oil spill response agencies, and
national environmental agencies, regional organisations working in the field of oil
pollution, academic institutions and ocean research institutes. Although it was quite
demanding and cumbersome process, it succeeded in generating significant quantity
of information concerning the issue. However, there are still certain areas with
insufficient information.
The capability of the states was examined basically on four factors - organisational
structure with designation of responsibilities for launching response, comprehensive
plan addressing all contingencies, availability of adequate equipment & other
resources and technical expertise in terms of adequately trained personnel. A few
other factors were also looked into to support the findings. The existing set up of
regional cooperative arrangements along with capabilities available with industry and
private entities was also considered. Based on these factors, the strengths and
weaknesses in the existing mechanisms were identified separately in each sub region.
The analysis of the South Asian region brings out that all countries, except India, have
a very limited capability of response. While Maldives does not have any capability,
Pakistan has recently started instituting the required framework after experiencing a
major disaster in the Tasman Spirit oil spill. Sri Lanka, on other hand, has the
implementing mechanism in place but lacks sufficient equipment and resources. India
being the largest country in the region has adequate resources and a well developed
organisation structure to respond to Tier –II spills up to 10000 tonnes. Although, there
are no formal cooperative arrangements at regional level, informal cooperation exists
between the countries to support joint operations. There is no private capability in any
country except in India where a significant number of private agencies and contractors
maintain response equipment stockpiles. The national legal set up and the ratification
of relevant IMO instruments is satisfactory with relatively few gaps. However, greater
thrust is needed in implementing liability and compensation measures in all countries
except India.
The Middle East sub- region is the most important area among the three groups in this
study due to the highest risk experienced. The analysis of the capabilities of various
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countries presents an interesting picture. Although, the region has witnessed some of
the largest oil spills in the world, and is home to a large number of major oil
producing and exporting countries, it is quite strange that the issue of marine oil
pollution was not provided the required attention. The majority of the countries have
been quite slow to establish a mechanism for oil spill response and were not party to
even the basic IMO convention related to marine pollution, MARPOL for a
considerable period of time. Due to the efforts of IMO and the regional organisations
operating in area, this lacuna has been addressed and many of them have now become
party to MARPOL and other relevant conventions. However, this aspect still leaves a
lot to be desired. Another peculiar finding of the study was that despite being a net
exporter of oil and thus facing almost negligible contribution costs, many countries
have not become a party to FUND convention which restricts their ability to recover
costs in oil spill response concerning third party liability.
The organising structure for oil spill response in many countries, although well
defined, still leaves a few gaps in implementation as the designated national
coordinator does not have the required capability and thus does not effectively control
the operations. It is the national oil companies or other organisations, which are
essentially controlling the operations. In Qatar, UAE and Oman, the respective
national oil company has a much larger capability than the national coordinator and
also effectively coordinates the operations. In Saudi Arabia, the Saudi Aramco
maintains a much larger inventory of equipment and resources than government
coordinator. Thus, it is generally observed that the national coordinator provides only
guidance while the operational control is given to operating facilities. However, this
system has a lacuna in a sense that the companies focus on their own requirements
and do not essentially cater for a contingency plan at national level. Thus, in case of a
tanker accident outside these facilities within national waters, the organisational
response would be severely restricted. Limited information about current status of
implementation of measures for oil spill response was available for Yemen, Bahrain
and UAE while no information was available for Iraq. However, Yemen is the only
country other than Iraq which is yet to ratify MARPOL and other relevant IMO
instruments on the subject.
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There are two regional organisations established in the area, PERSGA and ROPME,
which provide a framework for cooperative arrangements among the countries. The
efforts have been basically restricted to training and exercises, technical support and
other administrative arrangements rather than sharing of resources or launching joint
operations. However, these organisations, with the support from IMO, have been
successful in encouraging members to become party to IMO instruments and assisting
in strengthening of national response infrastructure through development of
contingency plan and other supporting structure in the countries that do not have these
arrangements.
The study also found that there is quite significant capability existing with the private
entities. Incidentally, Saudi Aramco maintains the largest stockpile of equipment
among the private operators worldwide. There are also cooperative arrangements
among the oil companies operating in area under RECSO for mutual sharing of
resources and at global level with OSRL which also maintains a Tier –III oil spill
response centre in Bahrain. In addition, the PAJ also has two stockpiles in the region
at Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia and six others located worldwide along the tanker
route to Japan which can be requisitioned by these oil companies. Thus, overall the
industry has access to a large inventory of equipment and resources. The author
considers that these cooperative arrangements are much more effective than the intergovernmental cooperative arrangements due to less bureaucratic approach, quick
response time and free from political and commercial issues.
Thus, the study highlights that the approach followed by the countries in this region is
different than the conventional approach where the governmental agencies remain a
dominant player in the oil spill response infrastructure in a country. In this case, the
major oil companies have a much larger role in organising response and contributing
resources than in other regions. The region is found to have sufficient capability to
respond to larger oil spills complementing adequately the high risk situation. However,
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the existing lacunae in implementation of recently ratified IMO conventions and gaps
in capabilities of a few countries may affect the efficient delivery of response to a
large oil spill involving such countries.
The North eastern African region presents an interesting contrast to the other two sub
regions in our study. While Somalia can obviously be disregarded in our study due to
absence of political entity administering the country, Eritrea has witnessed many
conflicts since independence which has seriously affected development efforts. This
has resulted in total lack of any effort towards marine conservation issues including
oil pollution .Sudan has also been focussing more on basic developmental activities
than environmental issues due to lack of resources. Incidentally, Eritrea and Sudan are
not a party to any of the IMO instruments related to marine pollution.
Djibouti is the only country which is party to all the relevant IMO instruments on the
subject. However, very limited information is available about the implementation of
these instruments in national domain. It has negligible capability to organise a
response to an oil spill incident due to lack of resources. Egypt is the only country in
this region with sufficient response capability. There is a clear defined organisational
structure with contingency planning arrangements. However, the majority of
equipment and resources are maintained by the major oil company.
With no capability existing in a major part of the region, the regional cooperative
arrangements have limited role in seeking joint operations or mutual assistance and
focuses on establishing a framework of response infrastructure in these countries
through technical and financial assistance. Overall, the capability to launch an
effective oil spill response is negligible or non- existent in most of the region except
around the coast of Egypt.
Thus the capability of the three regions in Northern Indian Ocean can be summarised
in Figure 19.
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HIGH RISK - NO CAPABILITY
HIGH RISK – HIGH CAPABILITY
MEDIUM RISK– MODERATE
CAPABILITY

Figure 19 : Capability of oil spill response in Northern Indian Ocean.
Source: Author, 2009
The status of ratification of conventions on oil pollution in the region is placed at
Appendix ‘C’.
The capabilities in two other oceanic regions, North Sea and Baltic Sea, were also
looked into to compare the mechanism in responding to oil spills. It has been found
that unlike in Northern Indian Ocean, all the countries in these regions are highly
proactive in ratifying relevant IMO instruments and developing a national response
infrastructure. The most notable difference between the two systems is the highly
developed regional cooperation which is functioning at operational level with sharing
of resources and equipment. The significant difference between the development
standards of the countries of Europe in comparison to countries of Northern Indian
Ocean makes it unsuitable to use this set up for comparison and analysis. However,
certain nuances of cooperative arrangements can be utilised to make a rational
judgement about effectiveness of regional organisations.
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5.2

Recommendations
(a)

There is a need for evolving formal cooperative arrangements at

regional level in South Asia. As most of the countries other than India have
limited resources and expertise, this would benefit in improving the overall
system of response not only in respective individual countries by gaining from
Indian experience, but also at regional level in organising joint response. The
current regional plan worked out under the auspices of UNEP South Asian
Seas Programme needs to be operationalised without further delay.
(b)

A special initiative needs to be considered by the IMO and PERSGA to

build up national capacity of North-eastern African states on priority to
address the large gap in response capabilities in a high risk region.
(c)

It is recommended to explore feasibility to provide financial as well as

technical support to the developing nations challenged by lack of resources,
through international organisations like IMO, UNEP, regional organisations
and industry associations. The provision of developmental funding especially
is critical for sustainability of any mechanism for non- priority areas in their
context like environment protection.
(d)

The old stockpile of oil spill combating equipment provisioned through

IMO at Djibouti needs to be operationalised without any delay to be available
for use in the Gulf of Aden.
(e)

Regional cooperative arrangements need to be worked out in the region

for operational level activities similar to those existing in the North Sea or
Baltic Sea enabling sharing of resources and launching joint operations in
addition to the existing arrangements for training and capacity building.
(f)

A special initiative needs to be considered by regional organisations in

Middle East to encourage improvement in liability and compensation
mechanisms in individual countries by ratification of FUND convention.
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(g)

There is a need for developing the national coordinating authority for

oil spill response towards accepting greater role and responsibility in the
Middle East. This will reduce the confusion in command and control structure
during response operation and prepare suitable ground for successful
implementation of the national contingency plan in all areas.
(h)

Article 6 of OPRC calls for parties to provide information to IMO

about the details regarding the competent national authority responsible for oil
pollution preparedness and response, availability of response equipment &
expertise and the national contingency plan. However, none of the countries in
the region, which are party to the OPRC, have done so. There is a need for the
countries in the region to provide such information to IMO to encourage
mutual cooperation through dissemination of requisite information to all
concerned.
(i)

A further research is recommended for addressing specific topics

affecting overall response capabilities in the region in areas of national
legislative framework and contingency planning arrangements.
(j)

During the research, it was found that there is no global database

maintained for recording all marine oil pollution incidents. While ITOPF data
is generally used for guidance even by IMO, it covers oil spills caused by oil
tankers and not by any other ships. Oil Spill Intelligence Report - International
Oil Spill Database is also known to maintain a database of oil spills in the
world from all sources. However, it is not widely available and does not
sufficiently address the requirement. Thus, there is a need for such a database
to be maintained by any shipping or marine organisations e.g. International
Chamber of Shipping (ICS).
The response to a marine oil spill is a complex process involving a combination of
operational capability and the supporting administrative and legislative framework.
The challenge of balancing the developmental needs in a developing country with the
requirement of addressing the environmental concerns cannot be resolved
comprehensively. The argument for considering their effects on the ability of a
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country to effectively develop and implement any mechanism addressing these
concerns has a sound basis but has not been explored for resolution. The conventional
response organisation structure calling for a dominant role of a governmental agency
is also being challenged by new arrangements developing increased reliability on
private efforts. The Northern Indian Ocean needs an increased focus from the
surrounding states and the regional & international bodies towards a more responsible
approach about the oil pollution issue.
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Appendix – A

PROPERTIES OF OIL INFLUENCING ITS BEHAVIOUR AT SEA

1.

Specific Gravity

2.

Distillation
Characteristics

3.

Viscosity

4.

Pour Point

The specific gravity of oil is its
density in relation to pure water.
Most oils are lighter than water and
have a specific gravity below 1.
The distillation characteristics of oil
describe its volatility. As the
temperature of oil is raised, different
components reach their boiling point
in turn and are distilled. The
distillation
characteristics
are
expressed as the proportions of the
parent oil which distill within given
temperature ranges.
The viscosity of oil is its resistance to
flow. High viscosity oils flow with
difficulty whilst those with low
viscosities
are
highly
fluid.
Viscosities decrease at higher
temperatures and so sea water
temperature and the extent to which
the oil can absorb heat from the sun
are important considerations.
The pour point is the temperature
below which oil will not flow. If the
ambient temperature is below the
pour point, the oil will essentially
behave as a solid.

Source: Response to marine oil spills, ITOPF, 1987.
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Appendix – B

LIST OF MAJOR OIL SPILLS FROM TANKERS*

South Asia
Vessel
Name
Tasman
Spirit
Cretan Star
Cherry
Vinstra
Aviles
Transhuron

Quantity Spilled
Tonnes
Type
30,000 Crude

Country

Year

Cause

Pakistan

2003

Grounding

29,000 Crude
16,000 Crude

India
India

1976
1974

Hull Failure
Hull Defect

11,000 White
Product
5,200 Crude

India

1979

Fire/Explosion

India

1974

Grounding

Year

Cause

Iran
Oman
Qatar

1985
1983
1983

Collision
Fire/Explosion
Fire/Explosion

UAE

1994

Collision

UAE

1998

Sinking

Middle East
Vessel
Name
Nova
Assimi
Pericles G
C
Seki
Pontoon
300

Quantity Spilled
Tonnes
Type
70,000 Crude
52,500 Crude
46,000 Crude
16,000 White
Product
5,500 Crude

Country

North-eastern Africa
Vessel
Name
Limburg

Quantity Spilled
Tonnes
Type
12,200 Crude

Country
Gulf of
Aden

* Over 5000 tonnes since 1974.
Source: ITOPF, 2009.
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Year
2002

Cause
Terrorist
Attack

Appendix - C

STATUS OF RATIFICATION OF CONVENTIONS ON OIL POLLUTION
South Asia
Country MARPOL OPRC
Yes
Yes
India
Yes
Maldives
Yes
Yes
Pakistan
Yes
Srilanka

CLC
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

FUND
Yes
Yes

CLC
Yes
Yes

FUND
Yes
Yes

Yes

Intervention
Yes
Yes
Yes

Middle East
Country MARPOL OPRC
Yes
Bahrain
Yes
Yes
Iran
Iraq
Yes
Jordon
Yes
Kuwait
Yes
Yes
Oman
Yes
Yes
Qatar
Yes
S.Arabia
Yes
UAE
Yemen

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Intervention
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

North-eastern Africa

Country
Djibouti
Egypt
Eritrea
Somalia
Sudan

MARPOL OPRC
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

CLC
Yes
Yes

Source: IMO, 2009
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FUND
Yes
Yes

Intervention
Yes
Yes

